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Judicial	  councils	  are	  often	  presented	  as	  a	  panacea	  for	  many	  disorders	  of	   judicial	  systems,	  
including	   low	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   assessment	   of	   their	  
impact	   has	   so	   far	   been	   neglected.	   The	   article	   offers	   a	   unique	   view	   on	   the	   relationship	  
between	   judicial	   councils	   and	   the	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   courts.	   It	   draws	   a	   novel	  
conceptual	   map	   of	   factors	   influencing	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary,	   stressing	   its	  
complex	  and	  multifaceted	  character.	  Situating	  the	  judicial	  councils	  on	  the	  map,	  it	  explores	  
how	   they	   can	  help	   to	  potentially	   increase	   the	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary,	  
and	  assesses	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  has	  been	  true	  in	  the	  countries	  that	  have	  adopted	  them.	  
The	   results	   reveal	   a	   considerable	   gap	  between	   the	  promises,	   expectations,	   and	  practice,	  
and	   raise	   doubts	   about	   the	   ability	   of	   judicial	   councils	   to	   enhance	   confidence	   in	   courts.	  
Judicial	   councils	   rarely	   manage	   to	   substantially	   improve	   institutional	   performance:	   they	  
can	  enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  judicial	  systems	  which	  have	  already	  functioned	  quite	  well,	  but	  
they	  do	  not	  tend	  to	  bring	  about	  change	  in	  the	  judicial	  systems	  that	  have	  been	  previously	  
significantly	  flawed.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  longitudinal	  Eurobarometer	  data	  showed	  that,	  on	  
average,	   the	   EU	   countries	   without	   judicial	   councils	   are	   better	   off	   in	   terms	   of	   public	  
confidence.	   Although	   the	   existence	   of	   judicial	   councils	   does	   not	   make	   a	   difference	  
regarding	  public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   in	   the	  new	  EU	  member	   states,	   in	   the	  old	  EU	  
member	   states,	   judicial	   systems	   with	   judicial	   councils	   enjoy	   lower	   levels	   of	   public	  




                                            
*	   Marína	   Urbániková	   is	   a	   senior	   researcher	   at	   the	   Judicial	   Studies	   Institute,	   Masaryk	   University,	   an	   assistant	  
professor	  at	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Social	  Studies,	  Masaryk	  University,	  and	  the	  head	  of	  research	  unit	  at	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  
Public	   Defender	   of	   Rights	   of	   the	   Czech	   Republic.	   Email:	   m.urbanikova@mail.muni.cz.	   ORCID:	   0000-­‐0003-­‐1640-­‐
9823.	  The	  research	  leading	  to	  this	  article	  has	  received	  funding	  from	  the	  European	  Research	  Council	  (ERC)	  under	  
the	   European	   Union’s	   Horizon	   2020	   research	   and	   innovation	   programme	   (grant	   no.	   678375-­‐	   JUDI-­‐ARCH-­‐ERC-­‐
2015-­‐STG).	  
**	   Katarína	   Šipulová	   is	   a	   senior	   researcher	   at	   the	   Judicial	   Studies	   Institute,	   Masaryk	   University,	   and	   external	  
advisor	   in	   EU	   law	   at	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   the	   Czech	   Republic.	   Email:	   katarina.sipulova@law.muni.cz.	   ORCID:	  
0000-­‐0002-­‐3593-­‐3594.	  




Since	   1989,	   Europe	   has	   witnessed	   a	   boom	   of	   judicial	   councils,	   i.e.	   institutions	   which	  
transferred	   various	   decision-­‐making	   powers	   regarding	   judicial	   self-­‐government	   from	  
politicians	   to	   judges	   and	   political	   nominees.	   This	   wave	   built	   on	   diverse	   motives:	   some	  
countries	   hoped	   to	   foster	   the	   efficiency	   and	   efficacy	   of	   judicial	   systems,	   while	   others	  
believed	   that	   judicial	   councils	   would	   help	   enhance	   the	   independence,	   accountability,	   or	  
legitimacy	  of	  domestic	  courts.	  All	  in	  all,	  the	  judicial	  councils	  were	  believed	  to	  enhance	  the	  
working	  of	   the	  courts	  and,	  depending	  on	  their	  success,	  enhance	  public	  confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary,	  as	  well.	  Despite	   judicial	  councils	  being	  eventually	  established	   in	  most	  European	  
countries,	  we	  know	   in	   fact	  very	   little	  about	  how	  they	  have	  performed.	  Following	  various	  
case	  studies	  presented	   in	   this	  Special	   Issue,	   this	  article	  zeroes	   in	  on	   judicial	   councils	  as	  a	  
possible	  determinant	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  	  
	  
Surprisingly,	   although	   public	   confidence	   is	   frequently	   identified	   as	   one	   of	   the	   goals	   of	  
judicial	   councils,	   legal	   scholarship	   has	   so	   far	   largely	   neglected	   this	   phenomenon.	   Having	  
the	   confidence	   of	   the	   public	   is	   of	   fundamental	   importance	   for	   the	   judiciary.	   Public	  
confidence	  links	  ordinary	  citizens	  to	  the	  institutions	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  serve	  them.	  The	  
public	   perception	   that	   courts	   provide	   basic	   protections	   to	   individuals	   and	   serve	   as	  
independent	   and	   impartial	   tribunals	   to	   resolve	   disputes	   is	   essential	   for	   the	   effective	  
performance	  of	  the	   judicial	   function.	   If	   the	  citizens	  do	  not	  trust	  the	  courts,	   they	  may	  not	  
accept	   judicial	   decisions	   and	  may	   resort	   to	   other	  means	   to	   resolve	   their	   disputes.	   Thus,	  
without	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary,	   its	   ability	   to	   provide	   justice	   is	   compromised,	  
which	  can	  have	  far-­‐reaching	  consequences	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  stability	  of	  democracy,	  and	  
social	   order.	   Moreover,	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   judicial	   system	   has	   lately	  
gained	   significance,	   since	   it	   can	   determine	   the	   transnational	   activities	   of	   citizens	   and	  
enterprises.	  	  
	  
The	   vital	   significance	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   judges,	   courts,	   and	   the	   judiciary	   is	   widely	  
acknowledged	  by	   various	   stakeholders	  on	  both	   the	  national	   and	   international	   levels.	   For	  
instance,	   ethical	   codes	   of	   judicial	   conduct	   usually	   state	   that	   judges	   are	   supposed	   to	  
maintain	   public	   confidence	   and	   should	   not	   do	   anything	   that	   would	   undermine	   it	   (for	  
example,	   the	   Preamble	   of	   Bangalore	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Conduct	   states	   that	   public	  
confidence	  in	  the	  judicial	  system	  and	  in	  the	  moral	  authority	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  judiciary	  is	  
of	   the	   utmost	   importance	   in	   a	   modern	   democratic	   society).1	   Furthermore,	   public	  
confidence	  is	  one	  of	  the	  indicators	  commonly	  used	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  judiciaries	  (e.g.,	  
                                            
1	  See	  also	  Bangalore	  Principles	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct	  of	  2002,	  value	  4	  identifying	  the	  judges	  as	  a	  subject	  of	  constant	  
public	   scrutiny;	   references	   to	  public	   confidence	  and	   the	   role	  of	   judges	  appear	  also	   in	   several	  national	   codes	  of	  
conduct,	   e.g.	   General	   Council	   of	   the	   Judiciary	   (Spain).	   Principles	   of	   Judicial	   Ethics,	   16	   December	   2016;	   United	  
States	   Courts.	   Code	   of	   Conduct	   for	   United	   States	   Judges,	   http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-­‐judgeships/code-­‐
conduct-­‐united-­‐states-­‐judges.	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in	   CEPEJ	   reports2	   or	   European	   Commission	   reports).3	   Sustaining	   or	   enhancing	   public	  
confidence	   in	  the	   judiciary	   is	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  declared	  by	  top	   judicial	  officials4	  and	  often	  
finds	   its	   place	   in	   new	   strategies,	   plans,	   reforms,	   and	   policies	   focusing	   on	   the	   judiciary	  
across	   the	  globe.5	  Although	  rather	   indirectly,	   references	  to	  public	  confidence	  can	  also	  be	  
traced	   in	   the	   reasoning	   justifying	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   power	   of	   judges	   in	   court	   governance,	  
which	   has	   been	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   and	   remarkable	   recent	   trends	   in	   the	  
administration	  of	  judiciary.6	  	  
	  
The	  establishment	  of	  judicial	  councils7	  as	  a	  panacea	  for	  deficiencies	  of	  judicial	  systems	  has	  
been	  strongly	  promoted	  by	  many	   international	  organizations.	  Both	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  
(CoE)	   and	   the	   European	   Union	   (EU)	   typically	   conditioned	   the	   successful	   accession	   of	  
countries	   with	   the	   institutional	   transformation	   of	   judiciaries	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	  
judicial	   councils	   as	   a	   model	   form	   of	   judicial	   self-­‐government.8	   The	   argumentation	  
substantiating	   the	   transfer	   of	   powers	   from	  politicians	   to	   judges	  was	   clear:	   establishing	   a	  
judicial	   council	  was	   expected	   to	   strengthen	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   and	   thus	  
lead	   to	   a	   better	   working	   judicial	   system.	   The	   judicial	   councils	   were	   expected	   to	   be	  
independent	  authorities,	  typically	  rooted	  in	  constitutions,	  overseeing	  the	  independence	  of	  
courts	   and	   judges	   from	   political	   influence,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   guaranteeing	   their	  
accountability,9	   as	   well	   as	   the	   effectiveness10	   and	   transparency	   of	   judicial	   systems,	   and	  
fostering	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  principles.	  Consequently,	  this	  improvement	  should	  also	  be	  felt	  by	  
                                            
2	   E.g.	  Report	   of	   CEPEJ	   on	   European	   Judicial	   Systems	   (2016).	   https://www.uihj.com/en/publication-­‐of-­‐the-­‐2016-­‐
report-­‐of-­‐cepej-­‐on-­‐european-­‐judicial-­‐systems_2165915.html.	  
3	   European	   Commission.	   Effective	   justice.	   https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-­‐and-­‐fundamental-­‐
rights/effective-­‐justice_en.	  	  
4	   E.g.	   Committee	   for	   the	   Evaluation	   of	   the	   Modernisation	   of	   the	   Dutch	   Judiciary	   (2006).	   Judiciary	   is	   Quality.	  
https://www.rechtspraak.nl/SiteCollectionDocuments/Judiciary-­‐is-­‐quality.pdf.	  	  
5	   E.g.	   United	   States	   Courts.	   Enhancing	   Public	   Understanding,	   Trust,	   and	   Confidence.	  
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-­‐reports/issue-­‐7-­‐enhancing-­‐public-­‐understanding-­‐trust-­‐and-­‐confidence.	   Or	  
Public	   Service	   and	   Trust	   Commission	   (2008).	   Strategic	   Plan	   for	   the	   Judicial	   Branch.	  
https://www.jud.ct.gov/Committees/pst/StrategicPlan.pdf.	  
6	  Kosař,	  David,	  Beyond	   Judicial	  Councils:	   Forms,	  Rationales	  and	   Impact	  of	   Judicial	   Self-­‐Government	   in	  Europe	   in	  
this	  issue.	  	  
7	  For	  a	  definition	  of	  a	  judicial	  council,	  see	  Kosař,	  id.	  
8	  Resolution	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  European	  Network	  of	  Councils	  for	  the	  judiciary	  (2008),	  Budapest,	  21-­‐
23	   May,	   2008;	   The	   European	   Network	   of	   Councils	   for	   the	   Judiciary	   (ENCJ):	   Council	   for	   the	   Judiciary	   Report	  
2010/2011.	  ENJC	  Project	  Team;	  Recommendation	  No.	  R	  (94)	  12,	  Committee	  of	  Ministers.	  
9	  Christopher	  M.	  Larkins,	   Judicial	   Independence	  and	  Democratization:	  A	  Theoretical	  and	  Conceptual	  Analysis,	  44	  
ASCL	  605	  (1996);	  PETER	  H.	  RUSSELL	  AND	  DAVID	  M.	  O’BRIEN,	  JUDICIAL	  INDEPENDENCE	  IN	  THE	  AGE	  OF	  DEMOCRACY	  (2001).	  
10	  Recommendation	  CM/Rec	  (2010)12	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  to	  member	  states	  on	  judges:	  independence,	  
efficiency	  and	  responsibilities,	  Committee	  of	  Ministers,	  17	  November	  2010,	  para.	  46.	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the	   users	   of	   the	   judicial	   system,	   i.e.,	   by	   the	   general	   public,	   and	   thus	   be	   reflected	   in	   an	  
increasing	  level	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  
	  
Given	   the	  high	  hopes	   regarding	   the	  establishment	  of	   judicial	   councils,	   the	  question	   then	  
arises	  as	   to	  what	  extent	   they	  have	  been	   fulfilled.	  However,	   the	   literature	  on	   this	   topic	   is	  
scarce,11	   and	   systemic	   analysis	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   confidence	   in	   courts	   and	  
judicial	   councils	   is	   still	   missing.12	   Few	   existing	   studies	   focus	   predominantly	   on	   the	  
relationship	   between	   judicial	   conduct	   and	   public	   confidence,13	   let	   alone	   other	   possibly	  
intervening	  factors.	  	  
	  
Acknowledging	   the	   crucial	   importance	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary,	   this	   article	  
explores	   both	   the	   potential	   and	   factual	   consequences	   of	   the	   establishment	   of	   judicial	  
councils	   in	   this	   aspect.	   It	   aims	   to	   assess	   how	   judicial	   councils	   can	   enhance	   the	   level	   of	  
public	  confidence	   in	  the	   judiciary,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  has	  been	  true	   in	  the	  countries	  
that	   have	   adopted	   them.	   In	   order	   to	   do	   so,	   we	   created	   a	   novel	   concept	  map	   of	   public	  
confidence	  that	  categorizes	  the	  main	  factors	   identified	  by	  existing	  research	  as	  potentially	  
influential,	  and	  pinpoints	  the	  position	  of	   judicial	  councils	  among	  the	  determinants	  adding	  
to	   public	   confidence	   at	   the	   institutional,	   individual,	   and	   cultural	   level.	   Based	  on	  national	  
case	   studies	   presented	   in	   this	   Special	   Issue,	   complemented	   by	   longitudinal	   comparative	  
Eurobarometer	  data,	  we	  argue	  that	  1)	  citizens	  of	  both	  old	  and	  new	  EU	  member	  states	  have	  
greater	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   than	   other	   branches	   of	   power,	   irrespective	   of	   the	  
existence	  of	  judicial	  councils,	  2)	  EU	  countries	  without	  judicial	  councils	  enjoy	  higher	  levels	  of	  
public	   confidence	   in	   their	   judiciaries,	   and	  3)	  while	   the	  existence	  of	   judicial	   councils	   does	  
not	  make	  a	  substantive	  difference	   in	  the	  new	  EU	  countries,	   in	  the	  old	  EU	  member	  states	  
they	  coincide	  with	  even	  lower	  levels	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  
	  
The	   paper	   proceeds	   as	   follows:	   Section	   B	   starts	   with	   an	   examination	   of	   expectations	  
regarding	  the	  establishment	  of	  judicial	  councils,	  with	  a	  special	  focus	  on	  public	  confidence.	  
It	  surveys	  both	  official	  documents	  and	  scientific	  literature	  and	  shows,	  although	  indirectly,	  
that	  one	  of	   the	  rationales	   for	   the	   introduction	  of	   judicial	  councils	  has	  been	  the	  expected	  
increase	  of	  public	  confidence.	  Section	  C	  defines	  public	  confidence,	  explains	  its	  importance,	  
summarizes	   the	  main	   theories	   explaining	   how	   it	   emerges,	   and	   reviews	   empirical	   studies	  
                                            
11	  Argument	  raised	  e.g.	  by	  Nuno	  Garoupa	  &	  Tom	  Ginsburg,	  Guarding	  the	  Guardians:	  Judicial	  Councils	  and	  Judicial	  
Independence,	  57	  Am.	  J.	  of	  Comp.	  Law	  103	  (2009).	  	  
12	  For	  some	  exemption	  see	  e.g.	  US	  or	  common	  law	  scholarship:	  Sara	  C.	  Benesh,	  Understanding	  Public	  Confidence	  
in	  American	  Courts,	  THE	  JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICS	  697	  (2006).	  Sarah	  M.	  R.	  Cravens,	  Promoting	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  
Regulation	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct:	  A	  Survey	  of	  Recent	  Developments	  and	  Practices	  in	  Four	  Common	  Law	  Countries,	  42	  
MCGEORGE	  LAW	  REVIEW	  177–212	  (2011).	  
13	  Cravens,	  supra	  note	  12;	  Gregory	  A.	  Caldeira,	  Neither	  the	  Purse	  Nor	  the	  Sword:	  Dynamics	  of	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  
the	   Supreme	   Court,	   80	   THE	   AMERICAN	   POLITICAL	   SCIENCE	   REVIEW	   1209–1226	   (1986),	  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960864;	  Benesh	  Sara	  C.,	  supra	  note	  12.	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focusing	  on	  the	  determinants	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  Section	  D	  explores	  both	  
theoretical	  and	  empirical	  links	  between	  the	  establishment	  of	  judicial	  councils	  and	  the	  level	  
of	  public	  confidence.	  First,	  it	  investigates	  the	  mechanism	  on	  the	  theoretical	  level.	  Second,	  
based	   on	   the	   national	   case	   studies	   in	   this	   Special	   Issue,	   it	   reviews	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  
judicial	  councils	  in	  ten14	  countries	  fulfilled	  the	  expectations	  that	  were	  invested	  into	  them.	  
Then,	  based	  on	  Eurobarometer	  data,	   it	  examines	  whether	  the	   judiciaries	   in	  the	  countries	  
which	   have	   established	   judicial	   councils	   enjoy	   greater	   public	   confidence.	   Finally,	   the	  
conclusion	  summarizes	  the	  main	  findings,	  offers	  tentative	  interpretations	  of	  these	  findings,	  
reflects	  on	  the	  methodological	  limitations	  and	  suggests	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.	  	  
	  
B.	  Rationales	  Surrounding	   the	  Establishment	  of	   Judicial	  Councils:	  Did	  Public	  Confidence	  
Matter?	  	  
	  
Post-­‐war	   Europe	   restarted	   processes	   of	   judicial	   reform	   in	   nearly	   all	   transitioning	  
democracies.	   The	   introduced	   changes	   mostly	   mirrored	   the	   general	   distrust	   towards	  
concentrating	   power	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   one	   actor.15	   Constitutional	   courts16	   and	   judicial	  
councils	  symbolized	  the	  new	  institutions	  of	  democratic	  regimes,17	  helping	  to	  rid	  the	  courts	  
and	  judges	  of	  the	  political	  inference	  by	  the	  executive	  power.18	  The	  following	  section	  aims	  
to	   analyze	   the	   expectations	   put	   on	   the	   establishment	   of	   judicial	   councils	   regarding	   their	  
impact	   on	   the	   public’s	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   The	   section	   looks	   at	   both	   primary	  
national	   and	   international	   level	   documents	   and	   explores	   the	   presence	   of	   explicit,	   direct	  
references	  on	   the	  enhancement	  of	  public	   confidence.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   stress	   that	  while	  
this	  section	  identifies	  only	  explicit	  notions,	  empirical	  Section	  D	  also	  confronts	  these	  notions	  
with	  expectations	  identified	  by	  the	  authors	  of	  individual	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  Special	  Issue.	  	  
	  
I.	  International	  Reports	  
	  
International	  documents,	   recommendations,	  and	   statutes	  only	  gradually	  began	   to	   reflect	  
the	   relevance	  of	   the	  model	  of	   judicial	   self-­‐government	   (JSG)	   for	   the	  public	   confidence	   in	  
courts.	  The	  very	  first	  notion	  emerged	  in	  Bangalore	  Principles	  of	  Judicial	  Conduct	  of	  2002.19	  
                                            
14	  France,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  Netherlands,	  Poland,	  Romania,	  Slovakia,	  Slovenia,	  Spain,	  Turkey.	  	  
15	  HERMAN	  SCHWARTZ,	  THE	  STRUGGLE	  FOR	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  JUSTICE	  IN	  POST-­‐COMMUNIST	  EUROPE	  (2004).	  	  
16	   Shortly	   after	   the	   WW2,	   constitutional	   courts	   were	   introduced	   in	   Austria,	   Germany,	   Italy,	   Greece,	   Spain,	  
Portugal,	  Belgium,	  and	  France.	  Similar	  development	  followed	  after	  1989	  in	  post-­‐communist	  countries.	  
17	  ODIHR.	   Judicial	   Independence	   in	   Eastern	   Europe,	   South	   Caucasus	   and	  Central	   Asia.	   Challenges,	   Reforms,	   and	  
Way	  Forward.	  Meeting	  Report,	  23-­‐25	  June	  2010,	  https://www.osce.org/odihr/71178?download=true.	  	  
18	  Some	  authors	  however	  pointed	  out	   the	   risk	  of	  establishing	   judicial	   councils	   in	  countries	  which	  did	  not	  purify	  
and	  screen	  the	  post-­‐communist	  judiciaries.	  DAVID	  KOSAŘ,	  PERILS	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  SELF-­‐GOVERNMENT	  IN	  TRANSITIONAL	  SOCIETIES	  
(2016).	  
19	  THE	  BANGALORE	  PRINCIPLES,	  2002,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  11.	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The	  United	  Nations	  Judicial	  Group	  on	  Strengthening	  Judicial	  Integrity,	  which	  prepared	  the	  
Principles	  later	  revised	  at	  the	  Round	  Table	  Meeting	  of	  Chief	  Justices	  in	  The	  Hague	  in	  2002,	  
strongly	  believed	  that	  judicial	  accountability	  and	  judicial	  independence	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  rise	  
in	   the	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   (in	   the	   rule	   of	   law).20	   The	   Principles	   also	   identified	  
different	   levels	   of	   confidence	   in	   the	   courts’	   activity,	   depending	   on	   the	   adequate	  
information	  about	  the	  judiciary	  and	  its	  functions	  being	  available	  to	  citizens.21	  
	  
Similarly,	   the	   Kyiv	   Recommendations	   on	   Judicial	   Independence	   in	   Eastern	   Europe,	   South	  
Caucasus,	   and	   Central	   Asia22	   stressed	   the	   effect	   of	   administration	   on	   the	   facilitation	   of	  
public	   trust	   in	   the	   courts,	   especially	   through	   establishing	   the	   court	   positions	   of	   press	  
secretary	  or	  media	  officers.	  	  
	  
The	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  very	  active	  in	  recommendations	  on	  JSG	  in	  post-­‐communist	  Central	  
and	  Eastern	  European	  countries,	  did	  not	  reflect	  on	  the	  question	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  its	  
1994	  Recommendation.23	  Nevertheless,	  the	  restoration	  of	  public	  confidence	  emerged	  later	  
on	   in	   objectives	   and	   action	   plans	   meaning	   to	   strengthen	   judicial	   independence	   and	  
impartiality.24	  The	  reference	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  public	  confidence	  as	  one	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  judicial	  
councils	  later	  appeared	  in	  reports	  of	  the	  Venice	  Commission.25	  The	  European	  Commission,	  
on	   the	   contrary,	   identifies	  national	   justice	   systems	  as	   a	   key	   to	   restoring	   confidence,	   and	  
the	   structural	   justice	   reforms	   (while	   advocating	   judicial	   councils)	   as	   an	   essential	   tool	   for	  
effectiveness	  of	  national	  justice	  systems.26	  	  
	  
Lastly,	   in	   2017,	   the	   European	   Network	   of	   Judicial	   Councils	   adopted	   a	   report	   on	   public	  
confidence,	  stressing	  that	   judicial	  councils,	  “in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  rule	  of	   law,	  must	  do	  
all	   they	   can	   to	   ensure	   the	   maintenance	   of	   an	   open	   and	   transparent	   system	   of	   justice.	  
Equally,	  an	  open	  and	  transparent	  system	  of	  justice	  is	  a	  further	  precondition	  for	  establishing	  
                                            
20	  Commentary	  on	  Bangalore	  Principles	  https://rm.coe.int/168066d6b9.	  	  
21	  Id.	  	  
22	  OSCE	  and	  Max	  Planck	  Minerva	  Research	  Group	  on	   Judicial	   Independence.	  Kyiv	  Recommendations	  on	   Judicial	  
Independence	   in	   Eastern	   Europe,	   South	   Caucasus	   and	   Central	   Asia,	   https://www.osce.org/odihr/KyivRec?down	  
load=true.	  
23	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Committee	  of	  Ministers,	  Recommendation	  No.	  R	  (94)	  12	  (1994)	  http://www.barobirlik.org.	  
tr/dosyalar/duyurular/hsykkanunteklifi/recR(94)12e.pdf.	  
24	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Portal,	  https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-­‐rights-­‐rule-­‐of-­‐law/-­‐/council-­‐of-­‐europe-­‐launches-­‐
action-­‐plan-­‐on-­‐strengthening-­‐judicial-­‐independence-­‐and-­‐impartiality	   and	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   Plan	   of	   Action	   on	  
Strengthening	  Judicial	  Independence	  and	  Impartiality	  CM(2016)36	  https://rm.coe.int/1680700125.	  	  
25	   Venice	   Commission.	   Judicial	   Appointments.	   Discussion	   paper,	   14	   March	   2007,	   http://www.venice.coe.int/	  
webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-­‐JD(2007)001-­‐e.	  	  
26 European	   Commission.	   https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/justice-­‐and-­‐fundamental-­‐rights/effective-­‐justice/	  
improving-­‐effectiveness-­‐national-­‐justice-­‐systems_en.	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and	   maintaining	   the	   Public	   trust	   in	   justice,	   which	   is	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   legitimacy	   of	  
judiciary.”27	  The	  report	  identified	  several	  tools	  judicial	  councils	  could	  use	  to	  enhance	  public	  
confidence.	  
	  
In	   other	  words,	   international	   associations	   expected	   that	   judicial	   councils	  might	   enhance	  
public	   confidence,	   but	   only	   gradually.	   Most	   international	   documents	   merely	   pointed	   to	  
significant	  drops	   in	  public	  confidence	   in	   individual	   judiciaries	  or	   the	   importance	  of	  public	  
confidence	   for	   the	   state	   and	   society	   as	   such.	   Still,	   the	   rise	   in	   confidence	   is	   implicitly	  
expected	  to	  come	  with	   the	  creation	  of	  a	  more	  efficient	   judiciary	  –	  a	   task	   that	  was	  newly	  
assigned	  to	  the	  judicial	  councils.	  	  
	  
II.	  National	  reports	  
	  
National	   reports,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   often	   indicate	   a	   pressing	   need	   for	   judicial	   system	  
reform,	  which	  stems	  from	  a	  lack	  in	  public	  confidence.	  What	  these	  reports	  lack,	  however,	  is	  
a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  why	  confidence	  is	  low	  or	  how	  the	  proposed	  changes	  would	  help	  
to	   increase	   it.	   	   In	  general,	   references	   to	  public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	  appear	  at	   two	  
stages:	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  either	  the	  establishment	  or	  the	  reform	  of	  a	  judicial	  council.	  In	  
both	  instances,	  official	  domestic	  documents	  expected	  the	  judicial	  councils	  to	  either	  actively	  
respond	   to	   lowering	   public	   confidence	   or	   they	   stressed	   the	   need	   to	   build	   and	   promote	  
public	  confidence.	  Similarly	  to	   international	  documents,	  the	  rationale	   is	  only	   indirect:	  the	  
potential	   success	   of	   judicial	   councils	   in	   strengthening	   the	   effectiveness,	   independence,	  
accountability	  (etc.)	  of	  judiciaries	  should	  result	  in	  higher	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  courts.	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Table	  1:	  Values	  acknowledged	  in	  national	  reports	  as	  conditioning	  the	  rise	  of	  public	  
confidence,	  as	  identified	  in	  national	  reforms	  of	  judicial	  councils	  	  
(Source:	  authors)	  
	  
	  	   Independence	   Accountability	   Effectiveness	  	  
Establishment	  
Netherlands28	   Netherlands29	   Netherlands30	  	  
	   	   Belgium31	  	  
Reforms	  




Ireland34	   	   Ireland35	  




	   	  
Belgium39	  	  
                                            
28	  Philip	  M.	   Langbroek,	  Reform	  of	   the	   Judiciary	   in	   the	  Netherlands.	   Some	  Lessons	  after	   the	  First	  8	  Years.	  World	  
Bank	  Group,	  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECA/Resources/ReformJudiciaryNetherlands.pdf.	  
29	  Id.	  
30	   Philip	  M.	   Langbroek,	  Organization	   Development	   of	   the	   Dutch	   Judiciary,	   between	   Accountability	   and	   Judicial	  
Independence.	  IJCA:2	  (April	  2010).	  
31	  Le	  Conseil	  de	  la	  Justice,	  http://www.hrj.be/fr/content/historique.	  
32	  Conseil	   Superieur	   de	   la	   Magistrature,	   http://www.conseil-­‐superieur-­‐magistrature.fr/le-­‐csm/histoire-­‐et-­‐
patrimoine.	  
33	  La	  tutela	  dell’onore	  professionale	  e	  della	  dignità	  personale	  dei	  magistrati.	  L’esigenza	  di	  garantire	  il	  rispetto	  della	  
funzione	  giudiziaria.	  Resolution	  of	  the	  CSM,15	  December	  1999;	  Renato	  Balduzzi,	  Inauguration	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Year	  
2015.	   24	   January	   2015,	   https://www.csm.it/web/rbalduzzi/bacheca-­‐del-­‐consigliere/-­‐/blogs/inaugurazione-­‐dell-­‐
anno-­‐giudiziario-­‐2015;	  Consiglio	  Superiore	  della	  Magistratura,	  https://www.csm.it/web/csm-­‐internet/assistenza-­‐
al-­‐cittadino.	  
34	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  focus	  on	  public	  confidence	  appears	  only	  in	  the	  new	  2017	  proposal.	  Department	  of	  Justice	  
and	   Equality,	   Judicial	   Council	   Bill	   2017	   http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Judicial_Council_Bill_2017_Explanatory_	  
and_Financial_Memorandum.pdf/Files/Judicial_Council_Bill_2017_Explanatory_and_Financial_Memorandum.pdf	  
35	  Id.	  
36	  IBAHRI.	  Still	  under	  threat:	  The	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Hungary,	  2015.	  
37	  https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/files/white_paper_en_full.pdf.	  
38	  Id.	  
39	   Le	   Conseil	   de	   la	   Justice,	   http://www.hrj.be/fr/content/communique-­‐de-­‐presse-­‐le-­‐conseil-­‐superieur-­‐de-­‐la-­‐
justice-­‐10-­‐ans-­‐apres-­‐la-­‐marche-­‐blanche.	   The	   Belgian	   High	   Council	   of	   Justice.	   Presentation,	  
http://www.hrj.be/sites/default/files/press_publications/o0026b.pdf.	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As	   already	   mentioned,	   national	   legal	   reforms	   of	   judicial	   councils	   usually	   relate	   public	  
confidence	   to	   some	   other	   value	   (Table	   1);	   most	   frequently	   these	   are	   independence	  
(Netherlands,	   Poland,	   Italy,	   Hungary,	   Ireland),	   accountability	   (Netherlands),	   and	   the	  
perception	  of	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   judicial	   system	  (Netherlands,	  Poland,	  Hungary,	  France,	  
Ireland).	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  illustrative	  is	  the	  Dutch	  example,	  where	  the	  extensive	  research	  
on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  various	  JSG	  forms	  in	  other	  countries,40	  as	  well	  as	  public	  confidence	  
polls,	  preceded	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Council	   for	  the	  Judiciary.	  All	   in	  all,	  references	  to	  
public	  confidence	  appear	  as	  one	  of	  the	  rationales	  justifying	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  judicial	  
council	  mostly	  after	  1989,	  in	  countries	  introducing	  judicial	  councils	  in	  the	  last	  10-­‐15	  years.	  	  
	  
This	  section	  examined	  the	  expectations	  that	  both	  international	  and	  domestic	  reforms	  laid	  
on	   judicial	   councils	   in	   relation	   to	   public	   confidence.	   In	  most	   of	   the	   cases,	   the	   legislative	  
documents	  justified	  the	  reform	  or	  establishment	  of	  judicial	  councils	  by	  a	  need	  to	  increase	  
the	  independence,	  legitimacy,	  or	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  courts.	  Public	  confidence	  had	  
a	   certain	   place	   in	   these	   justifications,	   as	   both	   national	   and	   international	   rationales	  
expected	  that	  the	  success	  of	  judicial	  councils	  in	  fulfilling	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  aims	  would	  
translate	  into	  higher	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  	  
	  
C.	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Judiciary:	  Definition,	  Foundations,	  and	  Determinants	  	  
	  
As	  suggested	  above,	  judicial	  councils	  are	  often	  presented	  as	  a	  panacea	  for	  many	  disorders	  
of	   the	   judicial	  system,	   from	   low	   judicial	   independence	  to	   ineffective	  and	   inefficient	  court	  
management.	  They	  are	  expected	  to	   improve	  the	  quality	  of	   judicial	  systems,	  which	  should	  
consequently	  be	  reflected	  in	  increased	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  However,	  public	  
confidence	   is	  a	  multifaceted	  phenomenon,	  with	  plenty	  of	  various	   intervening	  factors	  and	  
determinants	   that	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account.	   To	   examine	   the	   possible	   links	   with	  
judicial	   councils,	   we	   first	   start	   with	   a	   comprehensive	   literature	   review	   and	   theoretical	  
considerations	  about	  public	   confidence.	  This	   section	  offers	  a	  working	  definition	  of	  public	  
confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   (Part	   I.),	   summarizes	   the	   main	   theories	   explaining	   how	   it	  
emerges	   (Part	   II.)	   and,	   based	   on	   previous	   empirical	   research,	   examines	   its	   main	  
determinants	  (Part	  III.).	  	  
	  
I.	  Defining	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Judiciary	  
	  
Questions	  regarding	  the	  trust	  and	  public	  confidence	   in	  political	   institutions,	   including	   the	  
judiciary,	   have	   long	   been	   of	   interest	   for	   scholars	   in	   social	   sciences.	   As	   suggested	   by	  
Sztompka41,	  there	  are	  some	  unique	  features	  of	  contemporary	  societies	  that	  give	  particular	  
salience	   to	   this	   topic.	  We	   live	   in	   a	   complex	   and	   interdependent	  world	  with	   increasingly	  
                                            
40	  See	  supra	  note	  4.	  
41	  PIOTR	  SZTOMPKA,	  TRUST:	  A	  SOCIOLOGICAL	  THEORY	  11-­‐15	  (2000).	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numerous	  options	  to	  choose	  from,	  which,	  moreover,	  is	  becoming	  more	  and	  more	  opaque	  
for	  us.	  Our	  existence	  and	  well-­‐being	  progressively	  depend	  on	  people	  and	  institutions	  which	  
are	  growingly	  anonymous	  and	  impersonal.	  Thus,	  to	  cope	  with	  these	  challenges,	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  cooperate,	  and	  to	  not	  become	  paralyzed	  by	  uncertainty,	  we	  need	  to	  have	  enough	  trust	  
in	  other	  people,	  as	  well	  as	  institutions.	  Trust	  and	  confidence	  are	  the	  social	  cement	  binding	  
interpersonal	  relationships	  in	  society	  and	  encouraging	  sociability	  and	  participation.	  In	  this	  
regard,	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   is	   especially	   important,	   because	   courts	   and	  
judges	  are	   the	  guarantors	  of	   justice	   to	  whom	  we	  resort	   in	  cases	  when	  our	   trust	   in	  other	  
people	  or	  institutions	  fails	  us.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
As	   is	   usually	   the	   case	   with	   broad	   concepts	   used	   across	   various	   disciplines,	   there	   is	  
considerable	   disagreement	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   trust	   and	   confidence.	   First,	   these	   two	  
concepts	  are	  very	  often	  used	  as	  synonyms,	  although	  sociology	   traditionally	  differentiates	  
between	  them.	   In	  this	  respect,	  Luhmann42	  distinguishes	  confidence,	  which	  refers	  to	   living	  
with	  everyday	  dangers	  without	  being	  actively	  involved	  and	  considering	  alternatives43,	  and	  
trust,	  which	  requires	  a	  previous	  engagement	  and	  presupposes	  a	  situation	  of	  risk	  where	  a	  
trusting	  agent	  must	  accept	  responsibility	  for	  potential	  disappointment.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  
view,	  when	   thinking	   about	   the	   general	   attitude	   of	   citizens	   towards	   the	   judiciary,	   usually	  
measured	  in	  public	  opinion	  polls,	  it	  seems	  more	  appropriate	  to	  refer	  to	  confidence,	  as	  the	  
vast	   majority	   of	   people	   do	   not	   have	   direct,	   first-­‐hand	   experience	   with	   courts.	   Their	  
relationship	  is	  more	  “detached,	  distanced,	  noncommittal”.44	  The	  term	  trust	  in	  the	  judiciary	  
should	  be	  reserved	  for	  situations	  in	  which	  people	  need	  to	  participate	  actively	  and	  face	  an	  
unknown	  future,45	  for	  instance,	  to	  choose	  whether	  to	  trust	  and	  turn	  to	  the	  court	  with	  their	  
issue,	   or	   rather	   try	   to	   settle	   it	   on	   their	   own	   or	   via	   extrajudicial	   proceedings.	   It	  must	   be	  
noted,	   however,	   that	   in	   practice,	   the	   majority	   of	   literature	   on	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary	   seems	   not	   to	   distinguish	   between	   trust	   and	   confidence.	   Similarly,	   official	  
international	   documents	   on	   JSG,	   as	   shown	   in	   Section	   B,	   use	   the	   terms	   interchangeably.	  	  
Moreover,	   some	   studies	   use	   trust	   and	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   as	   the	   main	  
indicator	  of	  other	  concepts,	  like	  public	  support,46	  esteem,47	  or	  social	  legitimacy.48	  	  
                                            
42	   Niklas	   Luhmann,	  Familiarity,	   Confidence,	   Trust:	   Problems	   and	   Alternatives,	  in	  TRUST:	   MAKING	   AND	   BREAKING	  
COOPERATIVE	  RELATIONS	  94–107	  (Diego	  Gambetta	  ed.,	  1988).	  
43	  E.g.,	  normally,	  we	  are	  confident	  that	  when	  we	  leave	  our	  homes	  in	  the	  morning	  and	  go	  to	  work,	  there	  will	  not	  be	  
a	  commando	  of	  snipers	  trying	  to	  shoot	  us	  down.	  Although	  it	  is	  possible,	  we	  bracket	  this	  option	  because	  it	  is	  highly	  
improbable,	  and	  also	  because	  otherwise	  we	  would	  have	  to	  live	  in	  a	  state	  of	  permanent	  uncertainty.	  	  
44	  Sztompka,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  25.	  
45	  Id.	  at	  25.	  
46	  E.g.,	   Jeffery	   J	  Mondak	  &	   Shannon	   Smithey	   Smithey,	  The	   Dynamics	   of	   Public	   Support	   for	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	  
59	  THE	  JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICS	  1114–1142	  (1997).	  
47	  E.g.,	  Caldeira,	  supra	  note	  13.	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Public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   positive	   expectations	   regarding	   the	  
conduct	  of	  judges	  and	  courts.49	  People	  have	  confidence	  in	  actors	  or	  institutions	  when	  they	  
believe	  they	  will	  act	  “as	  they	  should”.50	  It	  is	  the	  public’s	  belief	  in	  the	  reliability,	  honesty	  and	  
ability	  of	  courts	  and	   judges,	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  courts	  “act	  competently	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  
they	   are	   able	   to	   perform	   the	   functions	   that	   are	   legally	   or	   constitutionally	   assigned	   to	  
them”.51	  The	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  is	  of	  equal	  
importance.	   It	   does	   not	   necessarily	   invoke	   a	   negative	   mirror-­‐image	   of	   confidence	   -­‐	  
cynicism,	   and	   alienation	   -­‐	   but	   it	   can	   merely	   reflect	   ‘’skepticism,	   an	   unwillingness	   to	  
presume	  that	  political	  authorities	  should	  be	  given	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt’’.52	  Thus,	  when	  
citizens	  claim	  in	  a	  public	  opinion	  poll	  that	  they	  do	  not	  have	  much	  or	  any	  confidence	  in	  the	  
judiciary	  in	  their	  country,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  they	  consider	  the	  courts	  to	  be	  
unfair,	   corrupt	   and	   incompetent.	   It	   can	   also	   mean	   that	   they	   are	   rather	   skeptical	   and	  
suspicious	   and	   do	   not	   see	   enough	   reasons	   why	   they	   should	   grant	   them	   confidence.	   In	  
practice,	   to	   be	   able	   to	   differentiate	   between	   the	   two	   groups	   and	   assess	   their	   size,	   we	  
would	  need	  further	  and	  more	  detailed	  poll	  questions,	  which	  are	  usually	  missing.	  	  
	  
From	   the	   time	   perspective,	   the	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   reflects	   both	   short-­‐term	  
satisfaction	  with	  the	  performance	  of	  courts	  and	  judges	  (which	  can	  vary	  depending	  on,	  e.g.	  
agreement	  with	   salient	   and	   important	   judicial	   decisions,	   or	   occurrence	   of	   ad	   hoc	   affairs	  
and	   scandals),	   and	   long-­‐term	   attachments	   and	   loyalty,	   which	   can	   cushion	   the	   impact	   of	  
short-­‐term	   dissatisfactions.53	   Therefore,	   when	   examining	   the	   potential	   effect	   of	   judicial	  
councils	  on	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  we	  will	  use	  longitudinal	  data	  to	  account	  for	  
temporary	  increases	  and	  decreases.	  	  	  
	  
From	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   targets	   of	   trust,	   Sztompka	   distinguishes	   between	   interpersonal	  
trust/confidence	   in	  other	   actors	  with	  whom	  we	   come	   into	  direct	   contact	   (e.g.,	   the	   judge	  
who	  is	  handling	  our	  case),	  and	  its	  derivative,	  social	  trust/confidence	  towards	  more	  abstract	  
                                                                                                                
48	  E.g.,	  Marc	  Bühlmann	  &	  Ruth	  Kunz,	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Judiciary:	  Comparing	  the	  Independence	  and	  Legitimacy	  of	  
Judicial	  Systems,	  34	  WEST	  EUROPEAN	  POLITICS	  318	  (2011).	  
49	   Roy	   J.	   Lewicki,	   Daniel	   J.	  McAllister	   &	   Robert	   J.	   Bies,	   Trust	   and	   Distrust:	   New	   Relationships	   and	   Realities,	   23	  
ACADEMY	  OF	  MANAGEMENT	  REVIEW	  439	  (1998).	  
50 Jack	   Citrin	   &	   Christopher	   Muste, Trust	   in	   Government,	   in MEASURES	   OF	   POLITICAL	   ATTITUDES	  465-­‐532	   (John	  
Robinson,	  Phillip	  R.	  Shaver	  &	  Lawrence	  S.	  Wrightsman	  eds,	  1999).	   
51	   George	   W.	   Dougherty,	   Stefanie	   A.	   Lindquist	   &	   Mark	   D.	   Bradbury,	   Evaluating	   Performance	   in	   State	   Judicial	  
Institutions:	  Trust	  and	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Georgia	  Judiciary,	  38	  STATE	  AND	  LOCAL	  GOVERNMENT	  REVIEW	  176	  (2006).	  	  
52	  Timothy	  E.	  Cook	  &	  Paul	  Gronke,	  The	  Skeptical	  American:	  Revisiting	  the	  Meanings	  of	  Trust	   in	  Government	  and	  
Confidence	  in	  Institutions,	  	  67	  THE	  JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICS	  785	  (2005).	  	  
53	  James	  L.	  Gibson,	  Gregory	  A.	  Caldeira	  &	  Lester	  Kenyatta	  Spence,	  Measuring	  Attitudes	  toward	  the	  United	  States	  
Supreme	  Court,	  47	  AMERICAN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  364	  (2003).	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social	   objects,	   like	   social	   groups	   (e.g.,	   judges	   as	   a	   professional	   group),	   institutions	   and	  
organizations	   (e.g.,	   courts),	   their	   practices	   (e.g.,	   judicial	   procedures),	   or,	   at	   the	   most	  
general	  level,	  social	  systems	  or	  regimes	  (e.g.,	  the	  judicial	  system	  as	  a	  whole).54	  Therefore,	  
when	  examining	  the	  possible	  effects	  of	  judicial	  councils	  on	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence,	  
we	   are	   using	   the	   broadest	   possible	   indicator	   –	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   –	   to	  
account	  for	  potential	  spillovers	  of	  confidence	  on	  various	  levels.	  	  
	  
II.	  Foundations	  of	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Judiciary	  
	  
Before	   investigating	   the	  mechanism	   of	   how	   judicial	   councils	   could	   enhance	   the	   level	   of	  
public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  we	  first	  need	  to	  explore	  the	  foundations	  of	  confidence	  
and	   its	   main	   determinants,	   and	   to	   place	   the	   factor	   of	   our	   interest	   –	   effects	   of	   judicial	  
councils	  –	  within	  this	  context.	  After	  several	  decades	  of	  theorizing	  confidence,	  there	  are	  a	  
plethora	  of	  theories	  aiming	  to	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  born,	  enhanced,	  maintained	  or	  lost.	  Based	  
on	   these	   theoretical	   assumptions	   and	   expectations,	   how	   does	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary	  emerge,	  what	  are	  its	  main	  sources	  and	  determinants,	  and	  what	  is	  the	  position	  of	  
the	  factor	  of	  our	  interest	  –	  judicial	  councils	  –	  within	  this	  context?	  
	  
There	   are	   two	   competing	   views	   of	   the	   main	   source	   of	   both	   trust	   and	   confidence.55	  
According	  to	  the	  first	  one,	  it	  is	  a	  default	  expectation	  of	  other	  individuals’	  goodwill	  based	  on	  
individual	  dispositions	  (innate	  or	  learned	  early	  in	  life)	  to	  trust.	  Some	  people	  are	  inherently	  
more	  optimistic	  and	  less	  worried	  that	  others	  will	  let	  them	  down,	  and	  even	  after	  potential	  
disappointment,	  they	  try	  again.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  according	  to	  the	  relational	  view	  of	   trust	  
and	   confidence,	   it	   is	  mostly	   a	   property	   of	   a	   social	   relation	   between	   two	   or	  more	   actors	  
which	   “results	   from	   information	   about	   and	   past	   experience	   with	   the	   trustee	   and	   the	  
situation	  at	  hand	  and	   is	   a	  prediction	  about	   another	  person’s	  behavior”56.	  We	  argue	   that	  
these	  two	  mechanisms	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive,	  but	  in	  practice,	  they	  are	  both	  involved,	  
albeit	   to	   a	   varying	   extent.	   The	   tendency	   to	   place	   confidence	   in	   other	   people	   and	  
institutions,	   including	   the	   judiciary,	   is	   an	   individual	   disposition,	   but	   as	   such,	   it	   is	   also	  
culturally	  co-­‐determined	   (on	  a	  collective	   level,	   long-­‐term	  negative	  experiences	  and	   failed	  
expectations	  of	  the	  political	  institution	  can	  be	  culturally	  reproduced	  and	  can	  instill	  a	  lack	  of	  
public	   confidence	   in	   future	   generations).	   Moreover,	   this	   disposition	   is	   permanently	  
confronted	  with	  everyday	  experiences,	  and	  it	  works	  as	  a	  prism	  through	  which	  we	  evaluate	  
empirical	   evidence	   from	   everyday	   life	   and	   decide	   whether	   to	   change	   the	   dis/trusting	  
attitude	  or	  not.	  	  	  
	  
                                            
54	  Sztompka,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  41-­‐46.	   	  
55 ERIC	  M.	  USLANER,	  THE	  MORAL	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  TRUST	  (2002). 
56	  Sven	  Oskarsson,	  Torsten	  Svensson	  &	  PerOla	  Oberg,	  Power,	  Trust,	  and	  Institutional	  Constraints:	  Individual	  Level	  
Evidence,	  21	  RATIONALITY	  AND	  SOCIETY	  173	  (2009).	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Sztompka	   distinguishes	   three	   main	   grounds	   for	   trust	   and	   confidence:	   reflected	  
trustworthiness	   (primary	   trust),	   contextual	   cues	   (secondary	   trust),	   and	   trust	   culture.57	  
From	   this	   perspective,	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   is	   determined	   mainly	   by	   the	  
perceived	  trustworthiness	  of	   the	  courts	  and	   judges,	  which	   is	   influenced	  not	  only	  by	  their	  
performance,	  but	  also	  by	  their	  reputation	  (the	  record	  of	  past	  deeds),	  and	  appearance.	  To	  
estimate	   the	   trustworthiness	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   the	   public	   needs	   some	   knowledge	   and	  
information:	  courts	  and	  judges	  need	  to	  be	  transparent	  and	  visible	  enough,	  subordinated	  to	  
unambiguous	   criteria	   and	   standards	   of	   performance,	   and	   citizens	   should	   have	   some	  
competence	  to	  evaluate	  the	  cues	  of	  trustworthiness.	  The	  second	  determining	  set	  of	  factors	  
relates	   to	   external	   context,	   e.g.,	   accountability	   (presence	   of	   agencies	   enforcing	   the	  
trustworthiness).	  Finally,	  the	  third	  ground	  for	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  is	  rooted	  in	  
the	   broader	   cultural	   context,	   in	   collective	   memory,	   and	   in	   shared	   values,	   norms	   and	  
expectations.	  	  	  
	  
All	  of	  these	  views,	  albeit	  to	  a	  different	  extent,	  are	  reflected	  in	  the	  three	  main	  theoretical	  
traditions	  competing	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  origins	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  institutions.	  
First,	  social-­‐psychological	  theories	  treat	  trust	  and	  confidence	  as	  basic	  aspects	  of	  personality	  
types,	   which	   emerge	   in	   the	   first	   stages	   of	   psychological	   development.58	   This	   view	   sees	  
confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   at	   least	   to	   some	   extent	   as	   a	   given	   personality	   trait.	   Second,	  
cultural	  theories	  hypothesize	  that	  confidence	  originates	   in	   long-­‐standing	  and	  deep-­‐seated	  
beliefs	  about	  people	  that	  are	  the	  products	  of	  social	  experiences	  and	  socialization,	  and	  thus	  
also	  have	  roots	  in	  cultural	  norms.59	  Institutional	  confidence	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  interpersonal	  
trust	  projected	  onto	  political	  institutions.	  According	  to	  these	  theories,	  public	  confidence	  in	  
the	   judiciary	   is	   at	   least	   to	   some	   extent	   culturally	   determined	   and	   should	   differ	   between	  
culturally	   distinct	   countries.	   Third,	   institutional	   theories	   emphasize	   institutional	  
performance	  (the	  expected	  utility	  of	  institutions	  performing	  satisfactorily)	  instead.60	  Based	  
on	   these	   theories,	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   is	   determined	   by	   its	   performance,	  
which	   can	   include	   for	   instance	  efficiency,	   access,	   effectiveness,	   competence,	   equality,	   or	  
fairness.	  Again,	  we	   see	   these	   theories	   as	   complementary	   rather	   than	  mutually	  exclusive.	  
The	   three	   levels	   –	   individual,	   institutional	   and	   cultural	   –	   form	   the	   conceptual	   framework	  
within	  which	  we	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  judicial	  councils	  on	  public	  confidence.	  	  
 
                                            
57	  Sztompka,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  69-­‐101.	  
58	  Kenneth	  Newton	  &	  Pippa	  Norris,	  Confidence	  in	  Public	  Institutions:	  Faith,	  Culture	  or	  Performance?,	  in	  DISAFFECTED	  
DEMOCRACIES:	  WHAT'S	  TROUBLING	  THE	  TRILATERAL	  COUNTRIES?	  56	  (Susan	  J.	  Pharr	  &	  Robert	  D.	  Putnam	  eds.,	  2000).	  
59	   William	   Mishler	   &	   Richard	   Rose,	  What	   Are	   the	   Origins	   of	   Political	   Trust?	   Testing	   Institutional	   and	   Cultural	  
Theories	  in	  Post-­‐communist	  Societies,	  34	  COMPARATIVE	  POLITICAL	  STUDIES	  30-­‐62	  (2001).	  
60	  Newton	  &	  Norris,	  supra	  note	  58,	  at	  58.	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III.	  Determinants	  of	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Judiciary:	  Review	  of	  Empirical	  Evidence	  
	  
Inasmuch	   as	   judicial	   councils	   can	   influence	   the	   functioning	   of	   courts,	   their	   existence	   (or	  
lack	  thereof)	  and	  character	  naturally	  have	  a	  place	  among	  factors	  potentially	  influencing	  the	  
level	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   To	   evaluate	   their	   effect,	   we	   first	   need	   to	  
ascertain	  other	  possible	  determinants.	  Based	  on	  the	  review	  of	  empirical	  studies	  on	  public	  
confidence	   in	   political	   institutions	   in	   general,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   the	   judiciary	   in	   particular,	  we	  
identified	   the	   main	   factors	   with	   statistically	   significant	   influence	   on	   confidence,	   and	  
divided	   them	   into	   the	   three	   above-­‐mentioned	   levels:	   individual	   traits,	   cultural	  
characteristics,	  and	  factors	  related	  to	  institutional	  performance	  of	  state	  and	  judiciary.	  	  
	  
On	   the	   individual	   level,	   almost	   all	   the	   empirical	   analyses	   confirm	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  
relationship	   between	   various	   individual	   characteristics	   of	   citizens	   and	   the	   level	   of	   their	  
confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary,	  although	   the	  evidence	   is	   very	  often	  conflicting.	  This	   is	  hardly	  
surprising,	   given	   that	   the	   studies	   draw	   from	   different	   datasets	   from	   different	   countries	  
collected	  in	  different	  time	  periods.	  Socio-­‐demographic	  characteristics	  are	  among	  the	  most	  
commonly	  explored	  variables.	  Numerous	  studies61	  concluded	  that	  respondents	  with	  higher	  
income	  and	  economic	  status	  have	  greater	   institutional	  confidence.	  Regarding	  the	   level	  of	  
education,	   several	   US	   studies62	   concluded	   that	   more	   educated	   respondents	   have	   more	  
confidence	   in	   courts,	   while	   in	   selected	   Eastern	   European	   countries,	   education	   and	  
institutional	   confidence	   was	   found	   to	   be	   negatively	   associated,63	   and	   in	   other	   studies,	  
education	  was	   a	   non-­‐significant	   predictor.64	   From	   the	   viewpoint	   of	  gender,	   according	   to	  
some	  studies,	  women	  seem	  to	  have	  more	  confidence	  than	  men,65	  although	  there	  are	  also	  
analyses	   concluding	   the	   opposite.66	   The	   same	   applies	   to	   age:	   most	   of	   the	   reviewed	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  E.g.,	  Bühlmann	  &	  Kunz,	  supra	  note	  48,	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  332.	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  &	  Norris,	  supra	  note	  58,	  at	  9.	  William	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  &	  Richard	  
Rose,	  Trust,	   Distrust	   and	   Skepticism:	   Popular	   Evaluations	   of	   Civil	   and	   Political	   Institutions	   in	   Post-­‐Communist	  
Societies,	   59	   THE	   JOURNAL	   OF	   POLITICS	   444	   (1997).	   Ola	   Listhaug,	  Confidence	   in	   Institutions:	   Findings	   from	   the	  
Norwegian	  Values,	  27	  ACTA	  SOCIOLOGICA	  121	  (1984).	  James	  W.	  Stoutenborough	  &	  Donald	  P.	  Haider-­‐Markel,	  Public	  
Confidence	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court:	  A	  New	  Look	  at	  the	  Impact	  of	  Court	  Decisions,	  45	  THE	  SOCIAL	  SCIENCE	  JOURNAL	  
38	   (2008).	   Ryan	   Salzman	   &	   Adam	   Ramsey,	  Judging	   the	   Judiciary:	   Understanding	   Public	   Confidence	   in	   Latin	  
American	  Courts,	  55	  LATIN	  AMERICAN	  POLITICS	  88	  (2013).	  	  
62	  E.g.,	  Stoutenborough	  &	  Haider-­‐Markel,	  supra	  note	  61.	  Benesh,	  supra	  note	  12.	  James	  P.	  Wenzel,	  Shaun	  Bowler	  &	  
David	  J.	  Lanoue,	  The	  Sources	  Of	  Public	  Confidence	  In	  State	  Courts:	  Experience	  and	  Institutions,	  31	  AMERICAN	  POLITICS	  
RESEARCH	  200	  (2003).	  
63	   E.g.,	   Kadri	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  Explaining	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   Political	   Institutions:	   Some	   Illustrations	   from	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   States,	   39	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  AND	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  STUDIES	  493	  (2006).	  
64	  E.g.,	  Bühlmann	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  Rose,	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  61,	  at	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  &	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  61,	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  Christine	  A.	  Kelleher	  &	  Jennifer	  Wolak,	  Explaining	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  
Branches	  of	  State	  Government,	  60	  POLITICAL	  RESEARCH	  QUARTERLY	  717	  (2007).	  
66 E.g.,	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studies67	   claimed	   that	   older	   citizens	   exhibit	   higher	   confidence	   in	   institutions,	   but	   some	  
found	  that	  it	  was	  vice	  versa,68	  and	  another69	  discovered	  no	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  
Regarding	   ethnicity,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   reviewed	   studies70	   concluded	   that	   members	   of	  
ethnic	  minorities	  have	   less	   confidence	   in	  political	   institutions,	   including	   the	   judiciary.	  On	  
the	   contrary,	   according	   to	   another	   US	   study,71	   Latinos	   have	   more	   positive	   dispositions	  
towards	  the	  courts	  than	  their	  fellow	  citizens.	  	  
	  
Besides	   socio-­‐demographic	   characteristics,	   the	   direct	   and	   indirect	   experience	   of	   citizens	  
may	   also	   be	   important.	   Interestingly,	   several	   studies	   reported	   a	   negative	   relationship	  
between	  personal	  experiences	  with	  the	  court	  system	  (being	  a	  defendant	  in	  a	  criminal	  case	  
or	   a	   party	   to	   a	   civil	   proceeding)	   and	   its	   evaluation:	   as	   experience	   increases,	   support	  
decreases.72	  The	  only	  exception	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  a	  criminal	  juror	  in	  the	  
US,	  which	   increases	  the	   level	  of	  confidence	   in	  the	   judiciary.73	  Again,	  another	  study	  found	  
no	   statistically	   significant	   relationship	   between	   experience	   with	   the	   courts	   and	   level	   of	  
confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.74	  In	  addition,	  awareness	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  judiciary	  matter,	  
although	   the	   results	   are	   once	  more	   conflicting:	   according	   to	   several	   US	   studies,75	   more	  
knowledgeable	   respondents	   are	   more	   supportive	   of	   courts,	   but	   an	   analysis	   focusing	   on	  
Latin-­‐American	  countries76	  found	  an	  opposite	  relationship.	  The	  majority	  of	  citizens	  use	  the	  
media	   as	   their	   main	   source	   of	   information	   about	   the	   judiciary;	   in	   this	   respect,	   several	  
studies	  revealed	  that	  media	  consumption	   is	  positively	  associated	  with	  confidence	   in	   legal	  
                                            
67	  E.g.,	  Mishler	  &	  Rose,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  445.	  Newton	  &	  Norris,	  supra	  note	  58,	  at	  9.	  Kelleher	  &	  Wolak,	  supra	  note	  
65,	  at	  717.	  Listhaug,	  supra	  note	  61.	  
68	  E.g.,	  Stoutenborough	  &	  Haider-­‐Markel,	  supra	  note	  61.	  Lühiste,	  supra	  note	  63,	  at	  486.	  
69	  Bühlmann	  &	  Kunz,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  332.	  
70	  E.g.,	  Lühiste,	  supra	  note	  63,	  at	  491.	  Kelleher	  &	  Wolak,	  supra	  note	  65.	  Dougherty,	  Lindquist	  &	  Bradbury,	  supra	  
note	   50.	   David	   B.	   Rottman	   &	   Alan	   Tomkins,	  Public	   Trust	   and	   Confidence	   in	   the	   Courts:	   What	   Public	   Opinion	  
Surveys	  Mean	  to	  Judges,	  36	  COURT	  REVIEW:	  THE	  JOURNAL	  OF	  THE	  AMERICAN	  JUDGES	  ASSOCIATION	  24-­‐31	  (1999).	  
71	  Wenzel,	  Bowler	  &	  Lanoue,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  202.	  
72	  E.g.,	  Benesh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  704.	  Wenzel,	  Bowler	  &	  Lanoue,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  204.	  Thomas	  E.	  Fossati	  &	  James	  
W.	  Meeker,	  Evaluations	  of	   Institutional	  Legitimacy	  and	  Court	  System	  Fairness:	  A	  study	  of	  gender	  differences,	  25	  
JOURNAL	  OF	  CRIMINAL	  JUSTICE	  152	  (1997).	  	  
73	  E.g.,	  Wenzel,	  Bowler	  &	  Lanoue,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  206.	  
74	  Salzman	  &	  Ramsey,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  89.	  
75	  E.g.,	  Wenzel,	  Bowler	  &	  Lanoue,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  202.	  Benesh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  704.	  James	  L.	  Gibson,	  Gregory	  
A.	  Caldeira	  &	  Vanessa	  A.	  Baird,	  On	  the	  Legitimacy	  of	  National	  High	  Courts,	  92	  AMERICAN	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  REVIEW	  
350	  (1998).	  
76	  Salzman	  &	  Ramsey,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  88-­‐89.	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authorities.77	   Political	   attitudes	   matter	   as	   well:	   people	   with	   more	   centrist	   views	  
(supporting	   neither	   the	   extreme	   left	   nor	   right),78	   with	   a	   stronger	   orientation	   towards	  
liberty79	   and	   social	   order,80	   who	   support	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   democracy,81	   have	   higher	  
confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  those	  with	  a	  greater	  preference	  for	  a	  stronger	  
president	  exhibit	  less	  confidence.82	  Finally,	  unsurprisingly,	  political	  winners,	  i.e.,	  individuals	  
supporting	   the	   party	   which	   is	   currently	   in	   power,	   display	   higher	   levels	   of	   institutional	  
confidence.83	  	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   still	   on	   the	   individual	   level,	   perception,	   and	   evaluation	   of	   the	   current	  
economic	  situation,	  as	  well	  as	  of	   institutional	  performance	   (including	   the	   judiciary),	  have	  
significant	   effects	   on	   public	   confidence.	   First,	   the	   better	   an	   individual	   perceives	   the	  
economic	   conditions	   and	   the	   more	   optimistic	   she	   is	   about	   the	   future	   of	   the	   national	  
economy,	   the	  stronger	   is	  her	  confidence	   in	  political	   institutions,	   including	   the	   judiciary.84	  
Second,	  evaluation	  of	  the	  performance	  of	  political	   institutions	  also	  plays	  a	  role.	  As	  shown	  
by	  Mishler	  and	  Rose,85	  in	  post-­‐communist	  countries,	  people	  who	  think	  that	  the	  new	  regime	  
has	   increased	   freedom	  and	   treats	   them	  more	   fairly	   than	   the	  old	   regime	  are	  much	  more	  
likely	   to	   trust	   current	   political	   institutions,	   including	   the	   judiciary.	   In	   addition,	   several	  
studies	  found	  a	  strong	  negative	  correlation	  between	  the	  level	  of	  perceived	  corruption	  and	  
experience	  with	  corruption	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  political	  
institutions	   on	   the	   other.86	   Third,	  evaluation	   of	   the	   court	   system’s	   performance	  matters,	  
mostly	   regarding	   perceived	   fairness	   and	   agreement	   with	   court	   rulings.	   Several	   authors	  
argue	   that	   the	   public	   does	   not	   evaluate	   the	   courts	   by	   focusing	   primarily	   on	   either	  
performance	  or	   instrumental	   issues	   such	  as	  delays	  or	   costs,	  but	   instead,	  what	  matters	   is	  
                                            
77	   E.g.,	   Kelleher	   &	   Wolak,	   supra	   note	   65.	   Yingyos	   Leechaianan,	   Seksan	   Khruakham	   &	   Larry	   T.	   Hoover,	  Public	  
Confidence	   in	   Thailand’s	   Legal	   Authorities,	   14	   INTERNATIONAL	   JOURNAL	   OF	   POLICE	   SCIENCE	   &	   MANAGEMENT	   246-­‐263	  
(2012).	  	  
78	  E.g.,	  Listhaug,	  supra	  note	  61.	  
79	  E.g.,	  Stoutenborough	  &	  Haider-­‐Markel,	  supra	  note	  61.	  Gregory	  A.	  Caldeira	  &	  James	  L.	  Gibson,	  The	  Etiology	  of	  
Public	  Support	  for	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  36	  AMERICAN	  JOURNAL	  OF	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  658	  (1992).	  
80	  E.g.,	  Caldeira	  &	  Gibson,	  supra	  note	  79.	  
81	  E.g.,	  Salzman	  &	  Ramsey,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  87.	  
82	  E.g.,	  Salzman	  &	  Ramsey,	  supra	  note	  61.	  
83	  E.g.,	  Bühlmann	  &	  Kunz,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  332.	  Lühiste,	  supra	  note	  63,	  at	  491.	  
84	  E.g.,	  Lühiste,	  supra	  note	  63.	  Mishler	  &	  Rose,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  442.	  
85	  Mishler	  &	  Rose,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  441.	  
86	  E.g.,	  Salzman	  &	  Ramsey,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  87.	  Kelleher	  &	  Wolak,	  supra	  note	  67,	  at	  718.	  Lühiste,	  supra	  note	  63.	  
Mishler	  &	  Rose,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  48.	  Bianca	  Clausen,	  Aart	  Kraay	  &	  Zsolt	  Nyiri,	  Corruption	  and	  Confidence	  in	  Public	  
Institutions:	  Evidence	  from	  a	  Global	  Survey,	  25	  WORLD	  BANK	  ECONOMIC	  REVIEW	  232	  (2011).	  
2018	   The	  Influence	  of	  Judicial	  Councils	  on	  the	  Confidence	  in	  Courts	   2121	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
their	   perception	  of	   how	   the	   courts	   and	   judges	   treat	   the	  public,	   how	   fair	   the	  procedures	  
are,	   and	   how	   the	   courts	   exercise	   their	   authority.87	   Additionally,	   transparency	   and	  media	  
coverage	   matter:	   if	   specific	   rulings	   reach	   the	   public	   on	   a	   larger	   scale,	   they	   can	   have	   a	  
significant	   positive	   or	   negative	   impact	   on	   individual-­‐level	   confidence	   in	   the	   courts.	  
Disagreement	   with	   decisions	   (or	   at	   least	   with	   how	   they	   are	   interpreted)	   reduces	  
confidence,	  while	  pleasing	  decisions	  increase	  it.88	  	  
	  
Public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   is	   also	   influenced	  by	   the	  amount	  of	   interpersonal	   trust	  
and	   confidence	   (the	   tendency	   to	   trust	   other	   people).	   From	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   theories	  
explaining	  the	  emergence	  of	  confidence,	  interpersonal	  trust	  and	  confidence	  are	  located	  on	  
the	  borders	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  cultural	  levels.	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  it	  is	  to	  some	  
extent	   a	   personal	   trait	   which	   is	   inborn	   and	   developed	   in	   early	   childhood,	   and	   to	   some	  
extent,	   it	   is	   also	   culturally	   determined.	   According	   to	   cultural	   theories,	   interpersonal	  
confidence	   is	  an	  attribute	  of	  national	   character,	  and	   it	   spills	  over	   to	  political	   institutions,	  
and	  thus	  co-­‐determines	  institutional	  trust.	  Several	  studies	  found	  that	  people	  and	  societies	  
with	  relatively	  high	  levels	  of	  interpersonal	  trust	  and	  confidence	  tend	  to	  also	  have	  relatively	  
high	   levels	   of	   confidence	   towards	   political	   institutions,	   including	   the	   judiciary.89	  
Nonetheless,	  Mishler	  and	  Rose90	  found	  that	  in	  post-­‐communist	  countries,	  this	  relationship	  
is	  weak,	  and,	  surprisingly,	  negative.	  
	  
Besides	  interpersonal	  confidence,	  another	  potential	  source	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  is	  
overall	  institutional	  confidence.	  It	  can	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  determinant,	  
because	   it	   partially	   stems	   from	   individual	   traits,	   from	   cultural	   norms,	   expectations,	   and	  
beliefs,	   and	   also	   from	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   institutions	   and	   how	   it	   is	   perceived.	  
Empirical	   studies	   focusing	   on	   various	   countries	   agree	   that	   overall	   confidence	   in	   political	  
institutions,	  particularly	  national	  government	  and	  parliament,	  significantly	  correlates	  with	  
confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.91	   
	  
                                            
87	  E.g.,	  Fossati	  &	  Meeker,	  supra	  note	  72.	  Tom	  R.	  Tyler,	  Public	  Trust	  and	  Confidence	  in	  Legal	  Authorities:	  What	  Do	  
Majority	  and	  Minority	  Group	  Members	  Want	  from	  the	  Law	  and	  Legal	  Institutions?,	  19	  BEHAVIORAL	  SCIENCES	  AND	  THE	  
LAW	  233	  (2001).	  
88	  E.g.,	  Stoutenborough	  &	  Haider-­‐Markel,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  41.	  Anke	  Grosskopf	  &	  Jeffery	  J.	  Mondak,	  Do	  Attitudes	  
Toward	   Specific	   Supreme	   Court	   Decisions	   Matter?	   The	   Impact	   of	   Webster	   and	   Texas	   v.	   Johnson	   on	   Public	  
Confidence	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  51	  POLITICAL	  RESEARCH	  QUARTERLY	  651-­‐652	  (2016).	  	  
89	  E.g.,	  Lühiste,	  supra	  note	  63.	  Newton	  &	  Norris,	  supra	  note	  60,	  at	  63.	  Kenneth	  Newton,	  Trust,	  Social	  Capital,	  Civil	  
Society,	  and	  Democracy,	  22	  INTERNATIONAL	  POLITICAL	  SCIENCE	  REVIEW	  211	  (2001).	  	  
90	  Mishler	  &	  Rose,	  supra	  note	  59,	  at	  46.	  
91	  E.g.,	  Wenzel,	  Bowler	  &	  Lanoue,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  202.	  Salzman	  &	  Ramsey,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  87.	  Bühlmann	  &	  
Kunz,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  332.	  Benesh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  704.	  Stoutenborough	  &	  Haider-­‐Markel,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  
41.	   Magali	   Rheault	   &	   Bob	   Tortora,	  Confidence	   in	   Institutions:	   Africans	   Speak	   on	   the	   Meaning	   of	   Being	   Well	  
Governed,	  32	  HARVARD	  INTERNATIONAL	  REVIEW	  74	  (2011).	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On	   the	   cultural	   level,	   it	  must	  be	  noted	   that	  people	   in	  post-­‐communist	   countries	   tend	   to	  
have	   less	  confidence	   in	  other	  people	  and	  political	   institutions.	  Markova	  suggests	  that	  the	  
lack	   of	   trust	   and	   confidence	   is	   a	   product	   of	   previous	   oppression	   and	   totalitarian	  
socialization	   which	   fostered	   feelings	   of	   fear	   and	   suspicion.92	   Sztompka	   argues	   that	  
communist	   societies	   developed	   a	   "bloc	   culture"	   with	   various	   traits	   and	   characteristics	  
leading	  to	  the	  decay	  of	  trust.93	  Moreover,	  trust	  and	  confidence	  can	  be	  eroded	  by	  dramatic	  
and	   negatively	   perceived	   societal	   changes,94	   such	   as	   transformation.	   The	   pains	   of	   the	  
transformation	  process	  with	   its	   radical	   political,	   economic,	   and	   societal	   changes	   led	   to	   a	  
"post-­‐revolutionary	  malaise''	  and	  "the	  morning	  after	  syndrome'',	  and	  with	  that	  to	  a	  further	  
collapse	   of	   trust	   and	   confidence.95	   Thus,	   to	   summarize,	   the	   Communist	   regime	   eroded	  
trust	   in	   the	   state	  and	   its	   institutions,	   including	   courts	  and	   judges.	   The	   judicial	  profession	  
suffered	  from	  low	  prestige	  (both	  in	  social	  and	  financial	  terms)96	  and	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  
unattractive	  and	  corrupt.	   It	   seems	  that	   judiciaries	   in	  many	  post-­‐Communist	  countries	  did	  
not	   manage	   to	   rid	   themselves	   of	   these	   legacies.	   According	   to	   Eurobarometer	   data,	  
between	  2004	  and	  2017,	  in	  the	  old	  EU	  member	  states,	  on	  average	  57%	  of	  citizens	  tended	  
to	  trust	  their	  national	  justice/legal	  system,	  while	  in	  the	  new	  EU	  member	  states,	  it	  was	  only	  
36%.97	  	  	  	  
	  
Finally,	  the	   level	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	   judiciary	   is	   influenced	  by	  the	  performance	  of	  
the	  courts	  and	  judges,	  and	  because	  confidence	  in	  the	   judiciary	  is	  closely	  intertwined	  with	  
confidence	   in	   other	   political	   institutions,	   also	   by	   their	   performance.	   Regarding	  
performance	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  previous	  research	  shows	  that	  higher	  judicial	  independence,	  as	  
rated	   by	   country	   experts,	   has	   a	   positive	   effect	   on	   an	   individual’s	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary.98	   Regarding	   courts’	   activity	   and	   workload,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   number	   of	   cases	  
heard	  decreases	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence,99	  but	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  appeals	  helps	  to	  
increase	   it.100	   Visibility	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   measured	   as	   the	   media	   exposure	   of	   courts	   and	  
                                            
92	  IVANA	  MARKOVA,	  TRUST	  AND	  DEMOCRATIC	  TRANSITION	  IN	  POST-­‐COMMUNIST	  EUROPE	  1-­‐23	  (2004).	  
93	  Sztompka,	  supra	  note	  41,	  at	  152-­‐153.	  
94	   Roger	   Sapsford	  &	   Pamela	   Abbott,	  Trust,	   Confidence	   and	   Social	   Environment	   in	   Post-­‐Communist	   Societies,	   39	  
COMMUNIST	  AND	  POST-­‐COMMUNIST	  STUDIES	  59-­‐71	  (2006).	  
95	  Id.	  at	  160.	  
96	   ZDENEK	   KÜHN,	   THE	   JUDICIARY	   IN	   CENTRAL	   AND	   EASTERN	   EUROPE:	   MECHANICAL	   JURISPRUDENCE	   IN	   TRANSFORMATION?	   53	  
(2011).	  
97	  http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/index.	  
98	  E.g.,	  Bühlmann	  &	  Kunz,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  332.	  Salzman	  &	  Ramsey,	  supra	  note	  61.	  
99	  E.g.,	  Stoutenborough	  &	  Haider-­‐Markel,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  41.	  	  	  
100	  E.g.,	  Kelleher	  &	  Wolak,	  supra	  note	  65,	  at	  715.	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judges,	   has	   a	   positive	   effect	   on	   public	   confidence.101	   The	   same	   applies	   for	   gender	   and	  
ethnic	   diversity	   on	   courts:	   smaller	   disparities	   between	   the	   share	   of	   women	   and	   ethnic	  
minorities	  in	  the	  population	  and	  in	  the	  courts	  increase	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.102	  
As	  per	  judicial	  selection	  method	  (appointment	  or	  election),	  some	  studies	  claim	  that	  it	  does	  
not	   affect	   public	   confidence,103	   but	   another	   study	   claims	   that	   states	  with	   elected	   judges	  
have	   a	   lower	   level	   of	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary.104	   The	   power	   of	   the	   judicial	   system,	  
measured	   as	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   courts	   to	   check	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   political	  
decisions,	   seems	   to	  have	  no	  significant	  effect	  on	   individual	   confidence.105	   Lastly,	  and	  not	  
surprisingly,	   judicial	   actions	   can	   also	   have	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	   changes	   in	   public	  
confidence.106	  
	  
Regarding	  performance	  of	  the	  state	  and	  its	  institutions,	  the	  results	  of	  previous	  studies	  are	  
yet	  again	  mixed.	  Higher	  income	  inequality	  and	  poverty	  rates	  decrease	  public	  confidence	  in	  
political	  institutions,107	  but	  unemployment	  rates,	  tax	  burdens	  or	  inflation	  seem	  to	  have	  no	  
effect.108	   Some	   studies	   found	   a	   negative	   relationship	   between	   crime	   rate	   and	   public	  
confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary,109	   others	   claim	   that	   this	   factor	   is	   not	   significant.110	   Finally,	  
political	   events	   and	   affairs	   do	   affect	   the	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   courts,	   although,	  
naturally,	  no	  general	  conclusion	  can	  be	  drawn	  in	  this	  respect.111	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  E.g.,	   Stephan	  Grimmelikhuijsen	  &	  Albert	   Klijn,	  The	   Effects	   of	   Judicial	   Transparency	   on	   Public	   Trust:	   Evidence	  
From	  a	  Field	  Experiment,	  93	  PUBLIC	  ADMINISTRATION	  1006-­‐1007	  (2015).	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  E.g.,	  Kelleher	  &	  Wolak,	  supra	  note	  65,	  at	  715.	  
103	  E.g.,	  Wenzel,	  Bowler	  &	  Lanoue,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  205.	  Anthony	  J.	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  Colin	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  Affect	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  SOCIAL	  INQUIRY	  56	  (2016).	  
104	  E.g.,	  Benesh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  704.	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  E.g.,	  Bühlmann	  &	  Kunz,	  supra	  note	  48,	  at	  328.	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  E.g.,	  Caldeira,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  1223.	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  E.g.,	   Jean	  M.	   Twenge,	  W.	   Keith	   Campbell	  &	  Nathan	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   Carter,	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   and	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  E.g.,	  Kelleher	  &	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  supra	  note	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  Caldeira,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  1219.	  
109	  E.g.,	  Benesh,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	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110	  E.g.,	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  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  1219.	  Kelleher	  &	  Wolak,	  supra	  note	  67.	  
111	  E.g.,	  Caldeira,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  1219.	  
	  
2124 	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  	   Vol.	  19	  No.	  07	  
	  
D.	  How	  the	  Establishment	  of	  a	  Judicial	  Council	  Can	  Enhance	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  
Judiciary?	  Theoretical	  and	  Empirical	  Considerations	  
	  
Having	   identified	   the	   determinants	   that	   potentially	   influence	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary,	  it	  is	  now	  time	  to	  focus	  on	  judicial	  councils	  and	  their	  location	  among	  other	  factors.	  
As	  demonstrated	  in	  Section	  B,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  numerous	  articles	  analyzing	  the	  national	   level	  
mechanisms	  of	  judicial	  self-­‐governance	  included	  in	  this	  Special	  Issue,	  the	  establishment	  of	  
judicial	   councils	   has	   been	   associated	   with	   diverse,	   yet	   invariably	   great,	   expectations.	   In	  
short,	   judicial	   councils	  were	  expected	   to	  enhance	   the	  quality	  of	   the	   judiciary,	  usually	   via	  
strengthening	   judicial	   independence	   and	   autonomy	   (according	   to	   the	   authors	   of	   this	  
Special	   Issue,	   this	  was	   the	  main	  purpose	   for	   the	  establishment	  of	   judicial	   councils	  e.g.	   in	  
Spain,	  Romania,	  Slovakia	  and	  Turkey),	  or	  via	  improving	  its	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  (e.g.,	  
in	   the	   Netherlands).	  With	   some	   exaggeration,	   judicial	   councils	   are	   supposed	   to	   work	   as	  
deus	  ex	  machina	   and	   resolve	   the	   seemingly	  unsolvable	  problems	  of	   judiciaries.	   If	   judicial	  
councils	   manage	   to	   fulfill	   these	   expectations,	   they	   should	   improve	   both	   judicial	   system	  
performance	   and	   public	   image,	   and,	   consequently,	   enhance	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary.	   This	   section	   explores	   this	   link	   both	   theoretically	   and	   empirically.	   First,	   it	  
introduces	   a	   concept	  map	  depicting	  how	  public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	  emerges	   and	  
discusses	  the	  possible	  effects	  of	  judicial	  councils	  within	  this	  context	  (Part	  I.).	  Second,	  based	  
on	  the	  national	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  volume,	  it	  reviews	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  judicial	  councils	  
in	  ten	  countries112	  fulfilled	  the	  expectations	  that	  were	  invested	  into	  them	  (Part	  II.).	  Third,	  
based	  on	  longitudinal	  Eurobarometer	  survey	  data,	  it	  examines	  whether	  the	  countries	  with	  
judicial	  councils	  enjoy	  higher	  levels	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  than	  the	  countries	  
without	  judicial	  councils	  (Part	  III).	  
	  
I.	  How	  Can	  Judicial	  Councils	  Help	  to	  Raise	  the	  Level	  of	  Public	  Confidence	  in	  the	  Judiciary?	  
	  
Public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  is	  an	  intricate	  and	  multifaceted	  phenomenon,	  which,	  as	  
shown	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  has	  a	  many	  determinants	  (Section	  B).	  Thus,	  to	  answer	  the	  
question	  of	  how	   judicial	   councils	   are	  potentially	   able	  help	   to	  enhance	  public	   confidence,	  
we	  need	  to	  place	  them	  into	  the	  wider	  context.	  To	  show	  how	  limited	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  
judicial	   councils	   is,	   we	   present	   a	   concept	   map	   explaining	   how	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary	  emerges.	  
	  
The	   concept	  map	   (Figure	   2)	   is	   based	  on	   the	   literature	   review	   introduced	   in	   Section	  C.	   It	  
takes	  into	  account	  social-­‐psychological,	  cultural	  and	  institutional	  theories,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  
variables	   which,	   according	   to	   empirical	   studies,	   were	   statistically	   significantly	   associated	  
with	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence.	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  France,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  Netherlands,	  Poland,	  Romania,	  Slovakia,	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  Turkey.	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Figure	  2:	  Public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary:	  a	  conceptual	  map	  (Source:	  authors)	  
	  
	  
First,	  on	  the	  individual	  level,	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  has	  three	  main	  sources.	  Our	  
inclination	  to	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  builds	  on	  our	  perception	  of	  its	  performance,	  
which	  partially	  stems	  from	  our	  tendency	  to	  have	  confidence	  in	  other	  people	  (the	  amount	  
of	   interpersonal	   trust/confidence),	   and	   in	   other	   political	   institutions,	  mostly	   government	  
and	  parliament	  (the	  amount	  of	  institutional	  confidence).	  People	  form	  their	  opinions	  on	  the	  
performance	  of	  the	   judiciary	  (e.g.,	  perceived	  and	  experienced	  fairness	  and	   independence	  
of	  judiciary;	  delays;	  costs;	  level	  of	  corruption;	  agreement	  with	  specific	  rulings;	  etc.)	  mostly	  
based	   on	   how	   it	   is	   presented	   in	   the	  media,	   and,	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent,113	   on	   their	   direct	   or	  
indirect	  experience	  with	  judges	  and	  courts.	  	  
	  
                                            
113	  In	  the	  2013	  Eurobarometer	  survey,	  a	  majority	  of	  respondents	  -­‐	  57%	  -­‐	  claimed	  to	  have	  no	  personal	  experience	  
of	  any	   type	  of	   courtroom	  within	   the	   last	   ten	  years,	   and	  no	  close	   relative	  who	  has	  had	   this	   kind	  of	  experience.	  
Source:	   European	   Commission,	   Justice	   in	   the	   EU.	   Flash	   Eurobarometer	   385	   (2013),	  
http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/flash/fl_385_en.pdf2013	  (last	  visited	  Oct.	  12,	  2018).	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Second,	   on	   the	   institutional	   level,	   what	   matters	   for	   building	   confidence	   is	   the	   actual	  
performance	   of	   the	   judiciary	   (e.g.,	   fairness;	   efficiency;	   independence;	   ease,	   and	   cost	   of	  
access;	  effectiveness;	  competency;	  equality;	  etc.),	  as	  well	  as	  its	  media	  coverage.	  	  
	  
The	  third,	  the	  cultural	  level	  (wider	  historical,	  societal,	  political,	  and	  economic	  conditions)	  is	  
not	  linear	  but	  permeates	  both	  the	  institutional	  and	  individual	  levels.	  It	  affects	  not	  only	  the	  
performance	  of	  political	  institutions,	  including	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  the	  way	  they	  are	  depicted	  
in	  the	  media,	  but	  also	  the	  expectations	  and	  evaluations	  of	  the	  institutional	  performance	  by	  
citizens.	  Thus,	  we	  claim	  that	  the	  trichotomy	  between	  social-­‐psychological,	  institutional	  and	  
cultural	  theories	  of	  public	  confidence	  is	  a	  false	  one	  and	  that	  they	  should	  rather	  be	  seen	  as	  
mutually	  supplemental	  and	  interconnected	  layers	  of	  determinants	  of	  public	  confidence.	  	  
	  
It	  must	   be	   noted	   that	   although,	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   simplicity,	   the	   concept	  map	   depicts	   the	  
performance	  of	   the	   state	  and	   judiciary	   as	   the	   cause	  and	  public	   confidence	  as	   the	  effect,	  
this	   relationship	   is	   not	   unidirectional.	   As	   suggested	   by	   Van	   de	   Walle	   and	   Bouckaert,	  
performance	  has	  a	  certain	  impact	  on	  confidence,	  but	  the	  existing	  level	  of	  confidence	  may	  
also	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  perceptions	  of	  performance.114	  	  	  
	  
It	  follows	  from	  the	  above	  that	  the	  potential	  of	  judicial	  councils	  to	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  public	  
confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  is	  very	  limited.	  Obviously,	  they	  cannot	  have	  any	  direct	  effect	  on	  
the	  individual	  level,	  and	  they	  are	  too	  weak	  and	  subtle	  to	  affect	  the	  wider	  cultural	  level	  (it	  is	  
rather	   the	   other	   way	   round,	   the	   cultural	   level	   may	   co-­‐determine	   the	   existence	   and	  
functioning	   of	   judicial	   councils).	   Nor	   can	   they	   affect	   the	   level	   of	   confidence	   in	   other	  
political	   institutions	   or	   interpersonal	   confidence.	   Thus,	   the	   window	   of	   opportunity	   for	  
judicial	   councils	   is	  very	  constrained:	   their	  effect	  on	  public	  confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	  can	  
only	  be	  traced	  on	  the	  institutional	  level,	  and	  even	  here	  they	  compete	  for	  competences	  and	  
influence	   with	   other	   actors.	   They	   can	   enhance	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   by	  
improving	  the	  performance	  of	  courts	  and	  judges,	  and	  by	  improving	  their	  media	  coverage.	  
For	  instance,	  if	  judicial	  councils	  manage	  to	  enhance	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  
increase	   its	   effectiveness	   and	   efficiency	   as	   promised,	   this	   improved	   institutional	  
performance	   should	   lead	   to	   better	  media	   coverage	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   better	   personal	  
experiences	   of	   citizens	   with	   judges	   and	   courts,	   and	   thus	   to	   higher	   public	   confidence.	   It	  
must	  once	  again	  be	  noted	  that	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  citizens	  lack	  first-­‐hand	  experience	  of	  the	  
justice	  system,115	  and	  do	  not	  feel	  well-­‐informed	  about	  it,116	  media	  coverage	  seems	  to	  be	  at	  
least	   as	   important	   as	   institutional	   performance.	   It	   can	   be	   assumed	   that	   citizens	   are	   not	  
much	   interested	   in	   nor	   are	   they	   knowledgeable	   about	   the	   institutional	   setup	   of	   the	  
                                            
114	  Steven	  Van	  de	  Walle	  &	  Geert	  Bouckaert,	  Public	  Service	  Performance	  and	  Trust	  in	  Government:	  The	  Problem	  of	  
Causality,	  26	  INTERNATIONAL	  JOURNAL	  OF	  PUBLIC	  ADMINISTRATION	  908-­‐909	  (2003).	  
115	  European	  Commission,	  supra	  note	  113,	  at	  6.	  
116	  European	  Commission,	  supra	  note	  113,	  at	  16.	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judiciary,	  and	  what	  matters	   for	  them	  is	  how	  persuasive	  the	   judges	  are	   in	  explaining	  their	  
decisions	   in	   salient	   cases,	  how	   fair	   the	   judiciary	   seems	   to	  be	   to	  different	   societal	   groups	  
(including	   the	   most	   and	   the	   least	   powerful),	   how	   often	   scandals	   and	   affairs	   regarding	  
judges	  and	  courts	  occur	  (their	  absence,	  signaling	  the	  lack	  of	  self-­‐cleaning	  mechanisms,	  can	  
be	  as	  damaging	  as	  their	  all	  too	  frequent	  occurrence),	  and	  how	  other	  judges	  behave	  when	  
these	  occur.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	   if	   judicial	   councils	  want	   to	  enhance	   the	   level	  of	  public	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary,	  they	  not	  only	  need	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  judicial	  systems	  noticeably,	  but	  they	  
also	  need	   to	  be	  able	   to	  make	   this	   improvement	  visible	  and	  persuasive	   to	   the	  media	  and	  
citizens.	   In	  this	  sense,	   trustworthy	  and	  active	  representatives	  of	   judicial	  councils	  who	  are	  
willing	   and	   able	   to	   present	   the	   work	   of	   the	   council	   publicly,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   name	   and	  
comment	  on	  the	  problems	  and	  sore	  spots	  of	  the	  judicial	  system	  instead	  of	  helping	  to	  hide	  
them,	  are	  indispensable.	  
	  
II.	  (Mostly)	  Failed	  Expectations:	  Do	  Not	  Expect	  Independence	  and	  You	  Will	  Not	  Be	  
Disappointed	  
	  
To	   summarize,	   the	   potential	   role	   of	   judicial	   councils	   in	   enhancing	   the	   level	   of	   public	  
confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   is	   rather	   narrow:	   from	   the	   plethora	   of	   potential	   factors	  
influencing	   public	   confidence,	   they	   can	   affect	   institutional	   performance	   and	   media	  
coverage	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  even	  these	  only	  partially.	  To	  further	  investigate	  this	  link	  on	  
an	  empirical	  level,	  we	  need	  to	  explore	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  expectations	  of	  judicial	  councils	  
have	  been	  fulfilled,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  have	  helped	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  judicial	  
systems	  and	  their	  media	  representation.	  This	  endeavor	  is	  inescapably	  hindered	  by	  the	  lack	  
of	  data	  and	  scholarly	  literature.	  As	  there	  is	  no	  comparable	  data	  on	  the	  media	  coverage	  of	  
the	   judiciary	   in	  various	  countries,	  we	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	   judicial	  councils	  
improved	   the	   quality	   of	   judicial	   systems.	   Even	   though	   the	   first	   judicial	   councils	   were	  
established	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  20th	  century,	  the	  literature	  assessing	  their	  
impact	  has	  been	  very	  scarce.	  Fortunately,	  we	  can	  make	  use	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  presented	  
in	  this	  Special	  Issue,	  and	  summarize	  their	  results.	  	  
	  
Based	   on	   the	   case	   studies	   describing	   the	   functioning	   and	   effects	   of	   judicial	   councils	   in	  
France,	   Italy,	   Poland,	   Spain,	   Turkey,	   Romania,	   Slovenia,	   Ireland,	   Slovakia,	   and	   the	  
Netherlands,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  judicial	  councils	  rarely	  manage	  to	  improve	  the	  judicial	  
systems	   that	   have	   been	   previously	   significantly	   flawed,	   but	   they	   are	  more	   successful	   in	  
enhancing	  the	  quality	  of	  judicial	  systems	  which	  have	  already	  functioned	  quite	  well.	  In	  this	  
sense,	   the	   effects	   of	   judicial	   councils	   resemble	   the	   biblical	   “Whoever	   has	   will	   be	   given	  
more,	  and	  he	  will	  have	  an	  abundance.	  Whoever	  does	  not	  have,	  even	  what	  he	  has	  will	  be	  
taken	  away	  from	  him.”117	  More	  concretely,	  when	  judicial	  councils	  are	  established	  with	  the	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hope	   they	   will	   become	   guarantors	   of	   judicial	   independence	   in	   countries	   where	  
independence	   of	   the	   judiciary	   has	   been	   an	   issue,	   they	   rarely	   seem	   to	   fulfill	   this	  
expectation,	   and	   if	   they	   do,	   it	   is	   usually	   a	   long	   process.	   But	   if	   they	   are	   established	   in	  
countries	   where	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary	   has	   not	   been	   a	   concern,	   and	   they	   are	  
instead	  expected	  to	  enhance	  effectiveness	  and	  efficiency,	  they	  seem	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  
This	  means,	   in	   line	  with	  O’Brien’s	   argument,	   that	   a	   culture	  of	   judicial	   independence	  and	  
respect	  for	  the	  independent	  role	  of	  the	  judiciary	  by	  all	  the	  stakeholders	  is	  more	  important	  
than	   formal	   controls	   and	   institutional	   design.118	   It	   also	   brings	   us	   back	   to	   the	   previously	  
mentioned	  suggestion	  that	  judicial	  councils	  in	  new,	  emerging	  post-­‐communist	  democracies	  
faced	  huge	  risks	   if	  established	  within	  judiciaries	  which	  had	  not	  undergone	  any	  lustrations	  
or	  other	  personnel	  exchange	  after	  the	  transition.119	  
	  
In	  Romania,	  Slovenia,	  and	  Slovakia,	  the	  establishment	  of	  judicial	  councils	  aimed	  to	  secure	  
the	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary	   after	   the	   Communist	   regime,	   in	   compliance	   with	   the	  
recommendation	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   the	   pressure	   from	   the	   European	  
Commission.	   In	   Romania,	   as	   suggested	  by	   Selejan-­‐Guțan120,	   the	   judicial	   council	   “was	   not	  
sufficient	   for	   protecting	   the	   true	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary”,	   and	   the	   majority	   of	  
citizens	  do	  not	  have	  confidence	   in	  the	   judiciary.	   In	  Slovenia,	  as	  Avbelj	  puts	   it,	   the	   judicial	  
council	  has	  had	  a	  limited	  impact	  on	  independence,	  accountability,	  legitimacy,	  transparency	  
of	  and	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  and	  there	  have	  even	  been	  cases	  in	  which	  its	  (in)action	  
negatively	  affected	  these	  values.121	  Public	  confidence	  in	  the	  Slovenian	  judiciary	  is	  very	  low;	  
it	  has	  been	  in	  persistent	  decline	  since	  2007,	  and	  is	  today	  the	  lowest	  among	  all	  the	  Member	  
States	   of	   the	   European	   Union.122	   Regarding	   Slovakia,	   according	   to	   Spáč,	   Šipulová,	   and	  
Urbániková,	   the	   link	   between	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   judicial	   council	   and	   any	   potential	  
improvement	   in	   these	   values	   is,	   at	   best,	   dubious.123	   Moreover,	   Slovakia	   can	   serve	   as	  
definite	  proof	  that	  the	  mere	  establishment	  of	  a	  judicial	  council	  does	  not	  automatically	  lead	  
to	   higher	   public	   confidence	   in	   courts	   and	   the	   judiciary:	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   Slovak	  
justice/legal	  system	  constantly	  belongs	  among	  the	  lowest	  in	  the	  entire	  European	  Union.124	  
This	   is	  also	  due	  to	  the	  numerous	  scandals	  and	  affairs	   involving	  the	  top	  representatives	  of	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the	  judicial	  council.125	  Although	  the	  institutional	  framework	  in	  these	  three	  countries	  gives	  
“the	  impression	  of	  de	  jure	  impeccability”,126	  due	  mostly	  to	  cultural	  reasons	  (e.g.	  remnants	  
of	   the	  Communist	   totalitarian	  past,	   formal	  and	   informal	   interpersonal	  networks	  between	  
politicians	   and	   judges,	   judicial	   corporatism)	   as	   well	   as	   institutional	   reasons	   (e.g.,	  
insufficient	   organizational	   capacity	   for	   efficient	   functioning),	   at	   best,	   judicial	   councils	   did	  
not	  manage	  to	  fulfill	  the	  expectations	  placed	  on	  them,	  and	  did	  not	  help	  to	  enhance	  public	  
confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  At	  worst,	  they	  may	  have	  even	  helped	  to	  decrease	  it.	  
	  
Spain	  and	  Turkey	  offer	  a	  very	  similar	  story:	  what	  was	  expected	  from	  judicial	  councils,	  but	  
remained	  undelivered,	  was	  once	  again	   judicial	   independence.	  Torres	  Pérez	  claims	   that	   in	  
Spain,	   the	  political	  capture	  of	   judicial	  councils	  prevents	   it	   “from	  fulfilling	   its	  goal	  and	  has	  
contributed	   to	   undermining	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   as	   a	  whole”.127	   In	   Turkey,	  
according	   to	   Çalı	   and	  Durmuş,	   it	   has	   been	   “suspect,	  whether	   the	   different	   forms	   of	   JSG	  
have	   promoted	   judicial	   independence,	   given	   the	   highly	   politicized	   conditions	   that	   led	   to	  
many	  of	  the	  JSG	  reforms”.128	  	  
	  
Regarding	  France,	  Italy,	  and	  Poland,	  we	  can	  note	  some	  mixed	  results:	  although	  the	  judicial	  
councils	   helped	   to	   secure	   independence,	   other	   problems	   arose.	   Vauchez	   concludes	   that	  
even	   though	   the	   judicial	   council	   in	   France	   “has	   undoubtedly	   gained	   competences	   and	  
institutional	   autonomy,	   it	   remains	   firmly	   embedded	   in	   a	   dense	   web	   of	   links	   and	  
dependences	   that	   secure	   its	   integration	   within	   the	   body	   of	   the	   State”.129	   Similarly,	  
Benvenuti	   and	   Paris	   claim	   that	   in	   Italy,	   even	   though	   the	   High	   Council	   of	   the	   Judiciary	  
played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   securing	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   judiciary	   from	   the	   executive	  
power,	   this	   does	   not	   apply	   to	   the	   internal	   independence,	   and	   that	   “while	   securing	   the	  
independence	   of	   the	   judiciary,	   the	   Italian	   model	   of	   JSG	   has	   been	   far	   less	   effective	   in	  
making	   the	   judiciary	   accountable,	   which	   in	   turn	  may	   have	   affected	   professionalism	   and	  
diminished	   public	   confidence.”130	   Finally,	   Śledzińska-­‐Simon’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   Polish	   case	  
shows	   that	   even	   though	   in	   Poland	   (unlike	   in	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   post-­‐communist	  
countries),	   the	   Judicial	   Council	   succeeded	   as	   a	   guarantor	   of	   independence,	   this	  was	   not	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  Self-­‐Government	  in	  Italy:	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enough	  to	  enhance	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary;	  under	  the	  slogan	  of	  democratization,	  
the	  Government	  used	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  public	  and	  the	   judiciary	  to	  push	  through	  
its	  judicial	  reform	  (2017)	  diminishing	  the	  position	  of	  the	  judicial	  council.131	  
	  
There	   are	   two	   exceptions	   from	   these	   more	   or	   less	   skeptical	   national	   summaries:	   the	  
Netherlands	  and	  Ireland.	  It	  seems	  that	  in	  both	  countries,	  judicial	  councils	  were	  established	  
to	   improve	   the	  management	   of	   the	   courts,	   and	   they	  were	   not	   expected	   to	   become	   the	  
guarantors	   of	   judicial	   independence,	   also	   because	   in	   both	   countries,	   the	   judiciary	   has	  
traditionally	  enjoyed	  a	  high	   level	  of	   independence.	   In	   these	  cases,	   the	  promise	  has	  been	  
fulfilled.	   Regarding	   Ireland,	   O’Brien	   argues	   that	   “the	   creation	   of	   the	   Courts	   Service	   has	  
allowed	  the	  judiciary	  to	  improve	  the	  public	  image	  of	  the	  courts	  through	  improved	  facilities	  
and	   have	   increased	   the	   transparency	   of	   the	   courts	   system	   through	   the	   Courts	   Service	  
website	  and	  annual	   reports.	   It	   is	  possible	   that	   these	  changes	  have	  played	  a	   small	   role	   in	  
enhancing	   public	   trust	   and	   improving	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   judges	   and	   the	   courts.”132	   Mak	  
concludes	  that	  “judicial	  self-­‐government	  in	  the	  Netherlands	  can	  be	  assessed	  as	  functioning	  
adequately”	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   combination	   of	   rule-­‐of-­‐law	   values	   and	   new	   public	  
management	   values	   (effectiveness,	   efficiency,	   and	   a	   client-­‐oriented	   system),	   and	   that	  
“there	  is	  a	  high	  level	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  Dutch	  judiciary,	  which	  steadily	  ranks	  at	  around	  70%”.133	  
Curiously,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   establishment	   and	   functioning	   of	   judicial	   councils	   led	   to	  
concerns	   that	   the	   new	   public	  management	   approach	   puts	   judicial	   independence	   at	   risk:	  
some	   judges	   did	   not	   feel	   represented	   by	   the	   Council,	   objected	   to	   the	   temporary	  
appointment	   procedure	   for	   new	   court	   presidents,	   and	   claimed	   that	   the	   assessment	   of	  
judicial	  performance	  had	  come	  to	  emphasize	  output	  too	  much.134	  Thus,	  whereas	  the	  vast	  
majority	   of	   countries	   establish	   judicial	   councils	   with	   the	   hope	   that	   they	   would	   secure	  
independence,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  positive	  conclusion	  is	  that,	  fortunately,	  
the	  judicial	  council	  did	  not	  put	  this	  value	  in	  danger.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
III.	  Empirical	  Evidence:	  Do	  Countries	  With	  Judicial	  Councils	  Enjoy	  Higher	  Levels	  of	  Public	  
Confidence	  in	  the	  Judiciary?	  
 
Based	  on	  the	  case	  studies	  focusing	  on	  the	  ten	  countries	  with	  judicial	  councils	  summarized	  
above,	  we	   can	   conclude	   that	   in	   the	  majority	   of	   cases,	   the	   effects	   of	   judicial	   councils	   fell	  
short	   of	   expectations,	   especially	   if	   they	   were	   supposed	   to	   strengthen	   and	   guarantee	  
judicial	   independence.	   If	   judicial	   councils	   in	   the	   majority	   of	   cases	   do	   not	   help	   to	  
substantially	   and	   visibly	   enhance	   the	   quality	   of	   judicial	   systems,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	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assume	   that	   they	   are	   able	   to	   increase	   the	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   As	  
there	   are	   few	   examples	   of	   judicial	   councils	   delivering	   the	   expected	   results,	   we	   assume	  
that,	  on	  average,	   judiciaries	   in	  countries	  with	   judicial	   councils	  do	  not	  enjoy	  higher	  public	  
confidence	  than	   judiciaries	   in	  countries	  without	   judicial	  councils.	  To	  test	  this	  assumption,	  
we	  examine	  longitudinal	  comparative	  Eurobarometer	  survey	  data	  on	  public	  confidence	  in	  
the	   justice/legal	   system	   in	   all	   EU	  member	   states	   (representative	   national	   samples,	   >	   15	  
year	  of	  age).	  To	  account	  for	  temporary	  increases	  and	  decreases	  caused	  by	  ad	  hoc	  factors,	  
the	  analysis	  covers	  the	  time	  span	  between	  2004	  and	  2017.	  Obviously,	  the	  data	  from	  public	  
opinion	   polls	   do	   not	   allow	   us	   to	   move	   much	   beyond	   description:	   as	   demonstrated	   in	  
previous	   sections,	   public	   confidence	   has	   a	   whole	   variety	   of	   determinants,	   and	   the	  
existence	   and	   activity	   of	   a	   judicial	   council	   is	   only	   one	   of	   them.	   Thus,	   this	   analysis	   only	  
reveals	  whether,	   in	   general,	   the	   countries	  with	   judicial	   councils	   are	   better	   off	   regarding	  
public	   confidence,	   but	   it	   cannot	   serve	   as	   proof	   that	   higher	   or	   lower	   levels	   of	   public	  
confidence	  are	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  a	   judicial	  council.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  
potential	  effects	  of	  judicial	  councils	  on	  public	  confidence	  can	  be	  only	  hypothesized.	  	  	  
	  
As	   shown	   in	   Figure	  3,	   regardless	   of	   the	  existence	  of	   a	   judicial	   council,	   citizens	  of	   the	   EU	  
member	   states	   place	   greater	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   than	   they	   do	   in	   parliament	   or	  
government,	   the	   other	   two	   branches	   of	   state	   power.	   In	   general,	   judiciaries	   in	   countries	  
without	   judicial	   councils	   enjoy	   a	   higher	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   than	   judiciaries	   in	  
countries	  with	   them.	   In	   the	   former,	  between	  2004	  and	  2017,	  on	  average	  54%	  of	  citizens	  
claimed	  to	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  while	  in	  the	  latter,	  it	  was	  only	  44%.	  The	  level	  of	  
public	  confidence	  in	  national	  parliament	  and	  government	  in	  both	  above-­‐mentioned	  groups	  
is	   identical:	   in	   countries	   with	   a	   judicial	   council,	   33%	   of	   citizens	   tend	   to	   trust	   them,	   in	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Figure	  3.	  Comparison	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  parliament,	  government	  and	  judiciary	  in	  all	  EU	  
countries	  with	  and	  without	  a	  judicial	  council	  from	  2004	  to	  2017	  	  




As	  mentioned	  in	  previous	  sections,	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  correlates	  with	  public	  
confidence	   in	   political	   institutions	   and	   interpersonal	   trust/confidence,	   and,	   for	   various	  
reasons,	  both	  of	  these	  are	   lower	   in	  the	  post-­‐communist	  countries.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  
post-­‐communist	   countries	   were	   pushed	   by	   the	   Councils	   of	   Europe	   and	   the	   European	  
Commission	  to	  establish	  judicial	  councils.	  Thus,	  lower	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary	  in	  
the	  group	  of	  countries	  with	  judicial	  councils	  may	  be	  caused	  by	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  share	  
of	  new	  EU	  member	  states,	  where	  citizens	  tend	  to	  be	  distrustful	  toward	  other	  people	  and	  
political	  institutions,	  is	  higher	  in	  this	  group	  (10	  new	  EU	  member	  states	  v.	  9	  old	  EU	  member	  
states)	  than	  in	  the	  group	  of	  states	  without	  judicial	  councils	  (3	  new	  EU	  member	  states	  v.	  6	  
                                            
135	  Source:	  Eurobarometer,	  own	  calculation.	  Legend:	  The	  shares	  of	  trusting	  citizens	  are	  computed	  as	  averages	  of	  
respondents	   claiming	   to	   tend	   to	   trust	   in	   the	   respective	   institutions	   between	   October	   2004	   (the	   first	  
Eurobarometer	  round	  when	  the	  data	  were	  collected	  in	  both	  the	  old	  and	  new	  EU	  member	  states),	  and	  November	  
2017.	   In	   all	   the	   countries	   under	   examination,	   judicial	   councils	   were	   established	   before	   2004,	   with	   the	   only	  
exception	  being	  Latvia	  which	  established	   its	   judicial	   council	   in	  2010	   (nevertheless,	   Latvia	  was	   included	   into	   the	  
group	  of	  countries	  with	  a	  judicial	  council).	  
Countries	   without	   a	   judicial	   council:	   Austria,	   Croatia,	   Cyprus,	   Czech	   Republic,	   Finland,	   Germany,	   Greece,	  
Luxembourg,	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  
Countries	   with	   a	   judicial	   council:	   Belgium,	   Bulgaria,	   Denmark,	   Estonia,	   France,	   Hungary,	   Ireland,	   Italy,	   Latvia,	  
Lithuania,	  Malta,	  Netherlands,	  Poland,	  Portugal,	  Romania,	  Slovakia,	  Slovenia,	  Spain,	  Sweden.	  
Question	  wording:	  I	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  a	  question	  about	  how	  much	  trust	  you	  have	  in	  certain	  institutions.	  For	  
each	  of	  the	  following	  institutions,	  please	  tell	  me	  if	  you	  tend	  to	  trust	  it	  or	  tend	  not	  to	  trust	  it?	  National	  parliament,	  
National	  government,	  National	  justice/legal	  system.	  
38%	   38%	  
54%	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old	  EU	  member	  states).	  To	  account	   for	   this	  effect,	   in	  Figure	  4,	  we	  compared	   the	   level	  of	  
public	  confidence	  between	  four	  groups	  of	  countries:	  the	  new	  EU	  member	  states	  with	  and	  
without	   a	   judicial	   council,	   and	   the	   old	   EU	   member	   states	   with	   and	   without	   a	   judicial	  
council.	  	  
	  
It	   is	   obvious	   that	   the	   gap	   in	   institutional	   confidence	   between	   the	   new	   and	   the	   old	   EU	  
member	  states	  persists:	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  parliament,	  government,	  and	  the	  
judiciary	   is	   considerably	   higher	   in	   the	   old	   EU	   countries.	   The	   highest	   level	   of	   public	  
confidence	  is	  enjoyed	  by	  judiciaries	  in	  the	  old	  EU	  member	  states	  without	  judicial	  councils	  
(63%	  of	  citizens	  tend	  to	  trust),	  followed	  by,	  with	  a	  10	  %	  margin,	  the	  judiciaries	  in	  the	  old	  EU	  
member	   states	  with	   judicial	   councils	   (53%	   tend	   to	   trust).	   In	   the	  new	  EU	  member	   states,	  
only	  slightly	  more	  than	  one-­‐third	  of	  citizens	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  regardless	  of	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  judicial	  council.	  	  
	   	  
Figure	  4:	  Comparison	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  parliament,	  government	  and	  judiciary	  in	  the	  
new	  and	  old	  EU	  countries	  with	  and	  without	  a	  judicial	  council	  from	  2004	  to	  2017136	  
	  
                                            
136	   Source:	   Eurobarometer.	   For	   Legend,	   see	   supra	   note	   135.	   New	   EU	   member	   states:	   Croatia,	   Cyprus,	   Czech	  
Republic,	   Bulgaria,	   Estonia,	   Hungary,	   Latvia,	   Lithuania,	   Malta,	   Poland,	   Romania,	   Slovakia,	   Slovenia.	   The	   same	  
timeframe	  (2004-­‐2017)	  was	  applied	  to	  Bulgaria,	  Romania	  and	  Croatia,	  even	  though	  they	  became	  members	  of	  the	  
EU	   in	  2007	  and	  2013,	   respectively	   (however,	   the	  data	   is	   available	   since	  2004).	  Old	  EU	  member	   states:	  Austria,	  
Finland,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  Luxembourg,	  United	  Kingdom,	  Belgium,	  Denmark,	  France,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  Netherlands,	  
Portugal,	  Spain,	  Sweden.	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In	  summary,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  a)	  judiciaries	  enjoy	  higher	  public	  confidence	  than	  the	  
other	  two	  branches	  of	  state	  power,	  b)	  institutional	  confidence,	  including	  confidence	  in	  the	  
judiciary,	  is	  still	  considerably	  higher	  in	  the	  old	  EU	  member	  states	  than	  in	  the	  new	  ones,	  and	  
c)	  regarding	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	   in	  the	  new	  EU	  member	  states,	  
the	  existence	  of	  judicial	  councils	  does	  not	  make	  a	  difference,	  while	  in	  the	  old	  EU	  member	  
states,	   judicial	  systems	  with	   judicial	  councils	  enjoy	   lower	   levels	  of	  public	  confidence	  than	  
the	  ones	  without	  them.	  	  
	  
It	  has	  to	  be	  stated	  once	  again	  that	  based	  on	  the	  descriptive	  data,	  we	  cannot	  conclude	  with	  
certainty	   to	  what	  extent	   the	  differences	   in	   the	   level	  of	  public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	  
between	  the	  countries	  with	  and	  without	  judicial	  councils	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  effects	  (or	  the	  
lack)	   of	   judicial	   councils.	   Public	   confidence	   is	   a	   complex	   phenomenon	   with	   plenty	   of	  
possible	   determinants,	   and	   the	   data	   presented	   above	   do	   not	   allow	   us	   to	   separate	   the	  
effect	  of	   judicial	   councils	   from	   the	  effects	  of	  other	   factors.	  Moreover,	  what	   is	  dubious	   is	  
not	  only	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  judicial	  councils	  on	  the	  level	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  
the	  judiciary,	  but	  also	  the	  direction	  of	  this	  relationship.	  As	  presented	  in	  Section	  B,	  judicial	  
councils	  were	  usually	  established	   in	   reaction	  to	  particular	  problems	  and	   issues	   that	  were	  
troubling	   the	   judiciaries:	   mostly	   flawed	   judicial	   independence,	   or,	   less	   often,	   the	  
effectiveness	  and	  efficiency	  of	  court	  management.	  We	  therefore	  assume	  that,	  due	  to	  these	  
drawbacks,	  these	  judiciaries	  may	  have	  already	  induced	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  public	  confidence,	  
and	   hence,	   the	   lower	   public	   confidence	   may	   not	   be	   the	   consequence,	   but	   rather	   an	  
antecedent,	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  judicial	  councils.	  After	  all,	   it	   is	  always	  easier	  to	  push	  ahead	  
the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   body	   when	   the	   current	   state	   of	   the	   art	   is	   unsatisfying;	   on	   the	  
contrary,	  the	  motivation	  to	  change	  the	  institutional	  setup	  of	  a	  well-­‐working	  judicial	  system	  
is,	  naturally,	  much	  lower.	  Unfortunately,	  given	  that	  many	  judicial	  councils	  were	  established	  
several	   decades	   ago,	  we	   do	   not	   have	   the	   data	   to	   test	   this	   assumption	   and	   examine	   the	  
level	  of	  public	  confidence	  before	  and	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  judicial	  councils.	  	  
	  
E.	  Conclusion:	  The	  (False)	  Promise	  Broken?	  	  
	  
Judicial	  councils	  emerge	  with	  very	  diverse	  aims,	  typically	  focusing	  on	  the	  enhancement	  of	  
the	  independence,	  and	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  of	   judicial	  systems.	  If	  successful,	  their	  
existence	   and	   functioning	   should	   lead	   to	   better	   working	   courts,	   and,	   consequently,	   to	  
higher	  public	  confidence	  in	  judicial	  systems.	  After	  the	  major	  wave	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  
judicial	  councils	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  last	  decades,	   it	   is	  about	  time	  to	  stop	  and	  review	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  judicial	  councils	  managed	  to	  fulfill	  the	  high	  hopes	  that	  were	  invested	  into	  
them.	  This	  paper	  focused	  on	  the	  thus	  far	  neglected	  questions	  of	  how	  judicial	  councils	  can	  
contribute	  to	  higher	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	   judiciary,	  what	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  looks	  
like	   in	   this	   regard,	   and	   whether	   the	   countries	   with	   judicial	   councils	   enjoy	   higher	   public	  
confidence	  than	  the	  countries	  without	  them.	  	  
	  
Public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   is	   a	   complex	   and	   multifaceted	   phenomenon	   with	   a	  
plethora	  of	  determinants,	  which	  makes	   the	  exploration	  of	   the	  possible	  effects	  of	   judicial	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councils	   a	   challenging	   endeavor.	   Public	   confidence	   in	   judiciary	   emerges	   in	   an	   interplay	  
between	  citizens’	  perceptions	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	  and	  performance	  of	   the	   judiciary	  on	   the	  
other	  hand.	  People	  evaluate	   judicial	   systems	  mostly	  based	  on	  media	   coverage,	  and,	   to	  a	  
lesser	  extent,	  based	  on	  their	  personal	  experiences	  with	  courts	  and	  judges.	  However,	  as	  the	  
media	  creates	  reality	  at	  least	  as	  much	  as	  it	  reflects	  it,	  and	  as	  personal	  experience	  with	  the	  
judiciary	  is	  usually	  quite	  rare	  and	  by	  no	  means	  representative,	  the	  link	  between	  perception	  
of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  its	  performance	  is	  far	  from	  straightforward	  and	  mirror-­‐like.	  Moreover,	  
people’s	  evaluations	  are	  a	  function	  of	  their	  expectations,	  which	  are	  partially	  subjective	  and	  
variable,	   and	  partially	   rooted	   in	   shared	   cultural	   norms,	   values	   and	  beliefs	   –	   and	  none	  of	  
these	   are	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   the	   judiciary	   or	   judicial	   councils.	   Finally,	   the	   tendency	   to	   have	  
confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary	   is	   often	   influenced	   by	   the	   individual	   tendency	   to	   have	  
confidence	  in	  other	  people	  and	  institutions	  in	  general,	  and	  by	  confidence	  in	  parliament	  and	  
government	   in	   particular	   (because	   citizens	   often	   perceive	   the	   three	   main	   branches	   of	  
power	   as	   “the	   establishment”	   and	   evaluate	   it	   together).	   This	   does	   not	   undermine	   the	  
importance	   or	   relevance137	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary.	   It	   merely	   shows	   how	  
complex	  and	  potentially	  fragile	  it	  is,	  and	  how	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  strategize	  on	  how	  to	  enhance	  
it	  or	  to	  measure	  any	  impact.	  
	  
In	  this	  broad	  context,	  judicial	  councils	  have	  some,	  albeit	  rather	  narrow,	  potential	  to	  affect	  
public	   confidence,	   mostly	   via	   improving	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   judiciary	   and	   its	   media	  
image.	   Moreover,	   if	   judicial	   councils	   are	   to	   enhance	   public	   confidence,	   their	  
representatives	  should	  induce	  trust	  and	  should	  not	  get	  involved	  in	  scandals	  and	  affairs	  (as	  
self-­‐evident	  as	  it	  may	  seem,	  some	  case	  studies	  from	  this	  Special	  Issue	  suggest	  that	  not	  all	  
top	   figures	   in	   judicial	   councils	   have	  managed	   to	  do	   so).	  On	   the	   contrary,	   they	   should	  be	  
able	   and	  willing	   to	   comment	   on	   and	   criticize	   the	  weak	   points	   (and	  weak	   figures)	   of	   the	  
judiciary,	  assure	  the	  public	  that	  they	  are	  being	  taken	  seriously,	  and	  suggest	  remedies.	  
	  
Based	   on	   the	   national	   case	   studies	   summarizing	   experiences	   with	   the	   functioning	   of	  
judicial	  councils	  included	  in	  this	  Special	  Issue,	  it	  seems	  that	  judicial	  councils	  rarely	  manage	  
to	  significantly	  improve	  institutional	  performance.	  They	  can	  enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  judicial	  
systems	   that	   have	   already	   functioned	   quite	   well,	   but	   they	   do	   not	   tend	   to	   bring	   about	  
change	   in	   the	   judicial	   systems	   that	   have	   been	   previously	   significantly	   flawed.	   More	  
concretely,	  when	  judicial	  councils	  are	  established	  with	  the	  hope	  to	  become	  guarantors	  of	  
judicial	  independence	  in	  countries	  where	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  has	  been	  an	  issue,	  
they	  do	  not	   seem	  to	   fulfill	   this	  expectation,	  or	   it	   is	  a	   lengthy	  process	  with	  mixed	   results.	  
But,	  if	  they	  are	  established	  in	  countries	  where	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  has	  not	  been	  
a	   concern,	   and	   they	   are	   instead	   expected	   to	   enhance	   effectiveness	   and	   efficiency,	   they	  
seem	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  majority	  of	  countries	  reviewed	  in	  this	  Special	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  After	  all,	  as	  the	  Thomas	  theorem	  says,	  “If	  men	  define	  situations	  as	  real,	  they	  are	  real	  in	  their	  consequences”.	  
Thus,	  citizens	  act	  according	   to	   their	   level	  of	  confidence	   in	   the	   judiciary,	  even	   though	   their	  perception	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  need	  to	  be	  objective.	  WILLIAM	  ISSAC	  THOMAS	  &	  DOROTHY	  SWAINE	  THOMAS,	  THE	  CHILD	   IN	  AMERICA:	  BEHAVIOR	  
PROBLEMS	  AND	  PROGRAMS	  571-­‐572	  (1928).	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Issue	  fall	  within	  the	  first,	  not	  the	  second	  scenario.	  In	  these	  cases,	  if	  judicial	  councils	  do	  not	  
help	   to	   substantially	   and	   visibly	   enhance	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   judicial	   system,	   there	   is	   no	  
reason	   to	   assume	   that	   they	   are	   able	   to	   increase	   the	   level	   of	   public	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary.	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  analyses	  of	  the	  longitudinal	  comparative	  Eurobarometer	  data	  revealed	  that,	  on	  
average,	   the	   EU	   countries	   without	   judicial	   councils	   are	   better	   off	   in	   terms	   of	   public	  
confidence	  (by	  a	  10%	  margin).	  Next,	  the	  citizens	  of	  both	  old	  and	  new	  EU	  states,	  regardless	  
whether	   judicial	   council	   exists	   in	   their	   country	   or	   not,	   report	   higher	   confidence	   in	   the	  
judiciary	  than	  other	  branches	  of	  state	  power	  (parliament	  or	  government).	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  
that	   the	  gap	   in	   institutional	  confidence	  between	   the	  new	  and	   the	  old	  EU	  member	  states	  
persists,	  with	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  latter	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  judiciary,	  
as	  well	  as	  parliament	  and	  government	  (by	  roughly	  one-­‐third).	  After	  this	  was	  accounted	  for,	  
the	   comparison	   revealed	   that	   in	   the	   new	   EU	   member	   states,	   the	   existence	   of	   judicial	  
councils	  does	  not	  make	  a	  difference	  regarding	  public	  confidence	   in	  the	   judiciary,	  while	   in	  
the	   old	   EU	   member	   states,	   judicial	   systems	   with	   judicial	   councils	   enjoy	   lower	   levels	   of	  
public	  confidence	  than	  the	  ones	  without	  them.	  	  
	  
That	  being	  said,	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  judicial	  council	  is	  to	  
be	  blamed	   for	   lower	  public	   confidence.	  As	   already	  mentioned,	   the	   judicial	   councils	   have	  
only	  limited	  power	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  structural	  causes	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  public	  confidence	  in	  the	  
judiciary,	  which	  often	  has	  deeper	  cultural	  and	  societal	  roots.	  Also,	  based	  on	  the	  descriptive	  
data,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  assess	  if	  and	  when	  public	  confidence	  decreased	  or	  remained	  low	  
precisely	  due	   to	   judicial	   councils.	   Too	  many	   factors	   influencing	  public	   confidence	   remain	  
hidden	   in	  a	  black	  box,	  and	   to	  assess	  other	  determinants	  of	  public	  confidence	  and	   isolate	  
the	  effect	  of	  judicial	  councils,	  more	  empirical	  research	  is	  needed.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  note	  that	  judicial	  councils	  seem	  to	  have	  emerged	  mostly	  in	  those	  systems	  which	  faced	  
certain	  systemic	  problems,	   typically	   the	   lack	  of	   independence	  or	   low	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  
courts,	   and	   therefore	   lower	   public	   confidence	   may	   be	   an	   antecedent	   rather	   than	   a	  
consequence	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  judicial	  councils.	  The	  evidence	  at	  hand	  only	  allows	  us	  
to	   conclude	   that,	   in	   the	  majority	  of	   countries,	   judicial	   councils	   do	  not	   seem	   to	   fulfill	   the	  
expectations	  that	  were	  invested	  into	  them	  nor	  do	  they	  significantly	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  
judiciaries,	  and	  consequently,	  they	  cannot	  enhance	  public	  confidence	  at	  least	  to	  the	  level	  
enjoyed	  by	   the	   countries	  without	   judicial	   councils.	  We	  will	   never	   know	  how	   the	   systems	  
would	  behave	  had	  the	  judicial	  councils	  not	  been	  established,	  though.	  	  
